yet it is no less true thatb the constant and conscionable persisting in performance of such duties, notwithstanding that all good means used, the poor Christian soul cannot attain to that alacrity that fain it would, may make them no less acceptable, if not more acceptable to God, than if they were done even with the greatest delight. Suppose two persons attend the King in his hunting, or at his sports, the one that taketh much delight in the game, the other that hath little or no delight in it: or the one lusty and healthy, and that attendeth him therefore with ease; the other weak and faint, or lame, or having some hurt about him, in regard whereof he cannot follow him but with much pain and difficulty, and yet will not give over, but be hard at his heels still, as ready and forward as the former. Hisc will may be every whit as good as the other, and his Sovereign is no less, if not more, for such his service beholden to him, than to the other. Nor may the service of such a poor soul therefore be the less acceptable to God, because it cannot perform it with such alacrity and delight asd it desireth. And in like manner for Faith and dependence upon ⟨p. 158⟩God. It is not an argument of no Faith, when a man cannot yet attain to a full persuasion and assurance of Gods special favour towards him, and of the free remission of his sins in Christ, that many other faithfule have had, and many doubtless also ordinarily have. This is a consequent rather of Faith, that asf Augustine saith of works, rather followeth the person justified, than precedeth and goeth before justification, as Faith beingg an instrumental cause of producing it as an effect doth. It is a consequent, I say, of it, deduced from it, as the same Father well hshoweth, by a Syllogism, wherein Faith is assumed, and this persuasion concluded from it: and that not simply and absolutely necessary neither, but such as is, by general consent, oft severed from it. But for a man, though he cannot yet attain to it, yea though he never should so long as he liveth, yet to resolvei to cleave unto God with full purpose of heart, to stick close unto him, to depend wholly upon him, and not to give over still seeking and suing to him for it, and the constant use of all good means to attain it;
yet it is no lesse true thatb the constant and conscionable persisting in performance of such duties, notwithstanding that all good meanes vsed, the poore Christian soule cannot attaine to that alac•ity that faine it would, may make them no lesse acceptable, if not more acceptable to God, than if they were done euen with the greatest delight. Suppose two persons attend the King in his hunting, or at his sports, the one that taketh much delight in the game, the other that hath little or no delight in it: or the one lustie and healthy, and that attendeth him therefore with ease; the other weake and faint, or lame, or hauing some hurt about him, in regard whereof he cannot follow him but with much paine and difficultie, and yet will not giue ouer, but be hard at his heeles still, as readie and forward as the former. Hisc will may be euery whit as good as the other, and his Soueraigne is no lesse, if not more, for such his seruice beholden to him, than to the other. Nor may the seruice of such a poore soule therefore be the lesse acceptable to God, because it cannot performe it with such alacritie and delight asd it desireth. And in like manner for Faith and dependance vpon ⟨p. 158⟩God. It is not an argument of no Faith, when a man cannot yet attaine to a full perswasion and assurance of Gods speciall fauour towards him, and of the free remission of his sinnes in Christ, that many other faithfulle haue had, and many doubtlesse also ordinarily haue. This is a consequent rather of Faith, that asf Augustine saith of workes, rather followeth the person iustified, than precedeth and goeth before iustification, as Faith beingg an instrumentall cause of producing it as an effect doth. It is a consequent, I say, of it, deduced from it, as the same Father well hsheweth, by a Syllogisme, wherein Faith is assumed, and this perswasion concluded from it: and that not simply and absolutely necessarie neither, but such as is, by generall consent, oft seuered from it. But for a man, though he cannot yet attaine to it, yea though he neuer should so long as he liueth, yet to resolue
- bQuibusdam lac, quibusdam vinum apponitur. Lacsuaviter bibitur, dulciter liquatur, sine laesione, sine amaritudine; vinu asperius est, & minus suave. Lac bibunt qui in sancto proposito suaeviter in••dunt, dulciter corrupt, &c. Vinū bibunt, qui vias vitae aggressi, & ingressi, corporis animeque tribulationibus contorquentur, sed non cedunt, neque recedunt tamen. Sed quis horum tibi videtur vel ille qui in suavitate, vel ille qui in asperitate currit viam mandatorum Dei? primus […], secundus furtior; uterque lamen justus, uterque pius. Bern. deconsc•ent. c. 3.Quibusdam lac, quibusdam vinum apponitur. Lacsuaviter bibitur, dulciter liquatur, sine laesione, sine amaritudine; vinu asperius est, & minus suave. Lac bibunt qui in sancto proposito suaeviter in••dunt, dulciter curru•t, &c. Vinū bibunt, qui vias vitae aggressi, & ingressi, corporis animeque tribulationibus contorquentur, sed non cedunt, neque recedūt tamen. Sed quis horum tibi videtur vel ille qui in suavitate, vel ille qui in asperitate currit viam mandatorum Dei? primus 〈…〉, secundus furtior; uterque lamen justus, uterque pius. Bern. deconsc•ent. c. 3.
- cVoluntas est, quae apud nos ponit o•ficium. Sen. de benes. l. 6. c. 12.
- dQuomodò de aegroto Aug. in Psal. 118. conc. 8. Aegrotus qui fastidio laborat, & vult evadere hoc malum, concupiscit desiderare cibum, dum concupiscit non habere fastidium. Et appetit animus, ut appeta• corpus, quando appetit animus, nec appetit corpus.
- eGalat. 2. 20. 1 John 3. 14. & 5. 19, 20.Galat. 2. 20. 1 Iohn 3. 14. & 5. 19, 20
