A01540:161
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The second Argument.
Secondly, if we consider aright the nature1 of a Lot, and the great uncertainty of it, we shall find it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and cnot fit to be used in any weighty affair. In regard whereof, as those that make use of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be material which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left unto it: so where it may be material and of some consequence whether it go the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquity of others may enforce a man unto; a less inconvenience is allowable for the avoiding of a greater;) there ⟨p. 68⟩dwill no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the uncertain hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be used.
SEcondly, if we consider aright the nature1 of a Lot, and the great vncertaintie of it, we shall finde it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and cnot fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make vse of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be materiall which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left vnto it: so where it may be materiall and of some consequence whether it goe the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquitie of others may inforce a man vnto; a lesse inconuenience is allowable for the auoiding of a greater;) there