A01540:177
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
therefore a Lot may more lawfully be used about weighty affairs, than it may about those that are of less weight. This premised for that branch of the Antecedent; I deny now Mr. Bs. not Consequent, but Consequence. And that for two causes: 1. Because though it were granted that the instances were to purpose, yet the Consequent will not necessarily flow from thence; In such three cases and upon such occasions a Lot was used in weighty affairs: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before. All that will follow; all granted that Mr. B. himself requireth; is but this, Therefore in weighty affairs sometimes a Lot is not unlawful; or (for I had almost forgotten my self) the use of a Lot is lawful. 2. Because the instances are nothing to purpose, being of such Lots as were extraordinary, and are not now imitable, as may appear by Mr. Bs. own grants in the very next words to these. The Question is about the lawful use ⟨p. 74⟩of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may lawfully use Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully use, the less weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disprove mine Affirmative herein, or to prove the contrary thereunto, Mr. B. produceth three Instances of Lots used in such cases, as none lawfully now may use them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinary providence bin certainly directed, the event was in hazard to have been of foul and fearful consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some unfit person designed to a place of the highest moment. That these examples are such, I have showed evidently *else-where, which Mr. B. ought to have taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senseless, as to imagine, that to find out a thief or a murderer, or the like, a Lot may now be used, or that in choice of a King, where the place is elective, a Lot may be cast upon the body of the State without exception of any, as in Sauls case it was, for the settling of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did bwith the Jews, when they cast Lots for an High-Priest, the Lot lighting upon ca most silly ignorant Ass. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Saviour