T. G. Here we return to our old coal-worts again, which, I see, will still be thrust upon us, and we must not refuse, unless we will seem to say nothing to that that Mr. B. saith to little purpose so oft.
1. Here is the distinction revived again between not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let Mr. B. remember what he set us on, when he served in the same before in effect: *That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoever is good is warranted; whatsoever is permitted is good: whatsoever is not forbidden is permitted: whatsoever therefore is not forbidden, is warranted. But observe what consequents will follow upon this conceit of Mr. Bs. to wit, that Some things that are not evil, (for nothing is evil, ⟨p. 94⟩that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by Gods word: Some things that are against no part of Gods Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are sins; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin; and whatsoever is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Divinity; and such it may be, as Mr. B. scarce dreamed of when he delivered this: and yet cfollow they necessarily upon the same.
2. Mr. B. passing by, as his manner is, the proof of mine Assumption before denied by him, disputeth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let us hear his Argument:
That use of a Lot is against Piety, that is not warranted by the word. But the use of a Lot in Game is not warranted by the word: Therefore it is against piety.
The Assumption which he should prove especially, he proveth not at all.
The Proposition, which indeed is unsound also, he proveth sorrily thus:
Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, yea impiety. Whatsoever▪ is not warranted by the word, is not of faith: Whatsoever therefore is not warranted by the word, is against Piety.
The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charity, the one comprehending the sum of the first Table distinct from the second, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without ⟨p. 95⟩faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offences properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogism granted nothing hurteth me.
3.
T. G. Here wee returne to our old cole-worts againe, which, I see, will still be thrust vpon vs, and we must not refuse, vnlesse we will seeme to say nothing to that that Mr. B. saith to little purpose so oft.
1. Here is the distinction reuiued againe betweene not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let Mr. B. remember what he set vs on, when he serued in the same before in effect: *That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoeuer is good is warranted; whatsoeuer is permitted is good: whatsoeuer is not forbidden is permitted: whatsoeuer therefore is not forbidden, is warranted. But obserue what consequents will follow vpon this conceit of Mr. Bs. to wit, that Some things that are not euill, (for nothing is euill, ⟨p. 94⟩that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by Gods word: Some things that are against no part of Gods Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are sinnes; for whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne; and whatsoeuer is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Diuinitie; and such it may be, as Mr. B. scarce dreamed of when he deliuered this: and yet cfollow they necessarily vpon the same.
2. Mr. B. passing by, as his manner is, the proofe of mine Assumption before denied by him, disputeth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let vs heare his Argument:
That vse of a Lot is against Piety, that is not warranted by the word. But the vse of a Lot in Game is not warranted by the word: Therefore it is against piety.
The Assumption which he should proue especially, he proueth not at all.
The Proposition, which indeed is vnsound also, he proueth sorily thus:
Whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne, yea impiety. Whatsoeuer▪ is not warranted by the word, is not of faith: Whatsoeuer therefore is not warranted by the word, is against Piety.
The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charitie, the one comprehending the summe of the first Table distinct from the second, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without ⟨p. 95⟩faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offences properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogisme granted nothing hurteth me.
3.
- *Contra quam Tertull. qui nulla ratione firma nixus negat, Bonum esse quicquid licet: Et licita esse asserit, quae non sant bona: exhort. ad castit. Et, Bonum, inquit, permitti non expectat. Ibid. Sed & idem ad Uxorem lib. 1. Quod permittitur, non est bonum.Contra quam Tertull. qui nulla ratione firma nixus negat, Bonum esse quicquid licet: Et licita esse asserit, quae non sant bona: exhort. ad castit. Et, Bonum, inquit, permitti non expectat. Ibid. Sed & idem ad Vxorem lib. 1. Quod permittitur, non est bonum.
- c[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. l. 1. c. 2. & 3. Uno dato absurdo caetera scquuntur.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. l. 1. c. 2. & 3. Vno dato absurdo caetera scquuntur.
