A01540:273
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. But to speak a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by just consequence, as that which is expressly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by just consequence, as that which is expressly permitted. Mr. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) deny the former. Again, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoever it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expressly or by just consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as have relation to God, ought to have some warrant from the word. If Mr. G. put me to prove this, I dare undertake to prove it demonstratively. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawful, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or evil, and she wing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, he determineth the point thus. Nevertheless most true it is, That no particular moral action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why Mr. G. should say here, Lottery ⟨p. 108⟩in game is not any where forbidden as evil of it self? That is good of it self which is either commanded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is evil of it self that is forbidden.
I. B. But to speake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by iust consequence, as that which is expresly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iust consequence, as that which is expresly permitted. Mr. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) denie the former. Againe, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoeuer it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expresly or by iust consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as haue relation to God, ought to haue some warrant from the word. If Mr. G. put me to proue this, I dare vndertake to proue it demonstratiuely. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or euill, and she wing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor euill, he determineth the point thus. Neuerthelesse most true it is, That no particular morall action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why Mr. G. should say here, Lotterie