A01540:373
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much less both jointly together. For neither is it true, that in every Lot things are by man disposed to a variable event: as where a controversy is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God ever wholly and immediately disposed, as in the proof of his Assumption is affirmed, and here only repeated; and much less are they ever disposed to such event, as by the users of the Lot is expected, but rather clean contrary sometime, as in eHamans example. But if it be so in all Lots, saith Mr. B. then mine Assumption is true. That is as much as to say, if you grant me what I affirm in the proof of mine Assumption, though I barely repeat it only, and do ⟨p. 168⟩not at all prove it; then mine Assumption standeth firm; to wit, that a Lot doth directly or of it self and in special manner tend to the advancing of the name of God, in attributing to his special providence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the event. Which by the way he demandeth, whether it scarce carry good sense or no: because I said it scarce did, being withal willing to salve the matter by supposing that the Printer might be in fault. But I see now, Mr. B. will take it upon himself; and I must show reason for what I said. What others therefore may deem of it I know not. But I supposed the word, to attribute, to be a verb transitive, requiring somewhat therefore to be expressed that should be attributed, as well as some thing or person to which or whom it should be attributed; which in Mr. Bs. words doth not appear. It were senseless for any man to say, that he doth in his words and deeds attribute to God, not expressing ought that he doth therein attribute unto him. But let us hear Mr. B. further.
That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much lesse both iointly together. For neither is it true, that in euery Lot things are by man disposed to a variable euent: as where a controuersie is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God euer wholly and immediatly disposed, as in the proofe of his Assumption is affirmed, and here onely repeated; and much lesse are they euer disposed to such euent, as by the vsers of the Lot is expected, but rather cleane contrary sometime, as in