A01540:423
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate providence in a Lot, as it is casual, then there is an immediate providence in all things that are casual. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to us, is a certain word of God (saith Bernard,1 but Mr. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting us with his will, p. 17. and, In casual events there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence, p. 22.
I. B. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate prouidence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate prouidence in all things that are casuall. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God (saith Bernard,1 but Mr. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting vs with his will, p. 17. and, In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence, p. 22.
- 1Sermo quidam.
T. G. But for over-burdening this Book, I would insert here mine own Argument at large: but so much as Mr. B. relateth shall suffice. He denieth (it seems) here the Assumption; and so averreth that which all evidence of daily experience doth abundantly confute; and which some of those therefore that have heretofore made this the main ground of their opinion in this point now do relinquish; that there is a special and immediate providence of God in every thing that falleth out casually, as in every meeting of any by the way unsought for (though his business lying this way and mine that way at that time are the means of our meeting) the stumbling at a stone, or stepping in some unclean thing,