A01540:426
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. But suppose there is not an immediate providence in all things that be casual, what is that to the purpose? For all things casual are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man unto an uncertain event: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God unto a certain event, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casual. Therefore all other casual things and Lots are not such.
I. B. But suppose there is not an immediate prouidence in all things that be casuall, what is that to the purpose? For all things casuall are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man vnto an vncertaine euent: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God vnto a certaine euent, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things and Lots are not such.
T. G. Mr. B. before denied mine Assumption. Now he denieth either the Conclusion, or nothing. Though it be so, saith he, in other casual things, yet in a Lot it is not so; for they are wholly disposed by God, that is, in Mr. Bs. understanding, there is an immediate providence of God in them, which is the contradictory of my Conclusion. What he talketh to no purpose in the world, of Lots not being such, is very frivolous. For either he understandeth not what I say, or what himself ⟨p. 190⟩would. I ground my Proposition, upon a generally received Axiom thus; *That which agreeth to a thing as it is such or such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such; Therefore whatsoever agreeth to a Lot as it is a Casualty, must necessarily agree to every Casualty. Mr. B. denieth neither Antecedent nor Consequence: but telleth us, that all casual things are not such with a Lot. To what, think we, doth this Answer? Every Casualty as it is a Casualty is such with each Casualty. For the same reason and common nature of Casualty is in each; though each of them have something over and beside distinct either from other. And what agreeth therefore to any Casualty as it is a Casualty, must needs agree unto all.