A01540:457
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. Mr. G. need lay no ground at all for his denial: It is enough for him barely to deny some Proposition, which upon his denial Mr. B. is to prove.
1. Mr. G. need lay no ground at all for his deniall: It is enough for him barely to denie some Proposition, which vpon his deniall Mr. B. is to proue.
2. Mr. G. doth not deny all this upon such ground as Mr. B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediate providence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in every extraordinary one: ⟨p. 204⟩for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to work in such manner save when he himself will? But because it cannot be proved that there is so ordinarily in ordinary Lots, nor doth the nature of a Lot require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already been showed.
2. Mr. G. doth not denie all this vpon such ground as Mr. B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediat prouidence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in euery extraordinary one: ⟨p. 204⟩for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to worke in such manner saue when he himselfe will? But because it cannot be proued that there is so ordinarily in ordinarie Lots, nor doth the nature of a Lot require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already beene shewed.
3. I might demand of Mr. B. how the use of a lusorious Lot can be a tempting of God, by desiring the manifestation of his special providence in his immediate disposing, if such an immediate providence of God be generally in all Lots. For what is it to tempt God, but to stint him to that, or to try him whether he will do that, or no, which it is uncertain whether he be willing unto or no? But if in all Lots such an immediate providence of God be, then it is certain before hand that God will so work in it. And if it be said, that God is not willing to have lusorious Lots ast; yet he is not unwilling, if this ground be good, when they are cast so to work in them: for who can enforce him to it, unless he will? A man might reason therefore rather backward from Mr. Bs. grounds, and say, An immediate providence of God is in every Lot necessarily: And, Therefore it is no tempting of God to expect that of it, that cannot but be in it, to wit, a special providence in disposing the Lot without means.