A01540:474
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To use Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtful, or uncertain matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Even by Gods whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principal hand in the determination? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or understood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the users thereof. ⟨p. 210⟩1. If that definition be but a sorry one, why did1 Mr. B. give no better? Or why doth he not show wherein it is defective? 2. You see still, he must have that granted him, which so oft he inculcateth, or else nothing will fadge with him. 3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principal, because a ruling and over-ruling hand in all things. Must solemn prayer therefore be necessarily used before every thing, every step that a man strideth, or every cherry that he eateth? 4. It is one thing to have prayer used about a thing; an other thing to have prayer necessarily understood or implied in it. 5. By this silly reason it may be proved that any serious affair about which solemn prayer is to be used, is of the same nature with an Oath.
I. B. But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Euen by Gods whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or vnderstood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof. ⟨p. 210⟩1. If that definition be but a sory one, why did1 Mr. B. giue no better? Or why doth he not shew wherein it is defectiue? 2. You see still, he must haue that granted him, which so oft hee inculcateth, or else nothing will fadge with him. 3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principall, because a ruling and ouer-ruling hand in all things. Must solemne prayer therefore be necessarily vsed before euery thing, euery step that a man strideth, or euery chery that he eateth? 4. It is one thing to haue prayer vsed about a thing; an other thing to haue prayer necessarily vnderstood or implied in it. 5. By this silly reason it may be proued that any serious affaire about which solemne praier is to bee vsed, is of the same nature with an Oath.