A01540:588
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. Secondly, why may there not be for a thing permitted, some precept in the word, general or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the word, either express or by just consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. G. reconcileth these two Axioms, [Every Action is indifferent] and [No Action is indifferent] thus, Every naked and bare Action simply conceived, is indifferent: But no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent, p. 94. So that he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular ⟨p. 258⟩moral Action, or no Action of the reasonable Creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto, p. 95. These things, especially these words (rules of Gods word) considered, I may say, that howsoever a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawful, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. G. saith, Recreation in general is both by permission and by precept, if not expressly yet by just consequence p. 138. Doth then Mr. G. make permission a just exception against the Proposition?
I. B. Secondly, why may there not be for a thing permitted, some precept in the word, generall or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the word, either expresse or by iust consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. G. reconcileth these two Axiomes, [Euery Action is indifferent] and [No Action is indifferent] thus, Euery naked and bare Action simply conceiued, is indifferent: But no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent, p. 94. So that he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular ⟨p. 258⟩morall Action, or no Action of the reasonable Creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto, p. 95. These things, especially these words (rules of Gods word) considered, I may say, that howsoeuer a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. G. saith, Recreation in generall is both by permission and by precept, if not expresly yet by iust consequence p. 138. Doth then Mr. G. make permission a iust exception against the Proposition?