A01540:589
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. G. Mr. B. having in stead of proving it overthrown his own Proposition: now cometh to try, if he can yet make good Mr. Easties. A thing may be warranted, say I, though neither by precept or practise, yet by permission. Against this Mr. B. objecteth, that for a thing permitted some precept may be. I answer. 1. Unless he say, must be, he saith nothing; because he saith nothing to the purpose. 2. If there be a precept for ought, so far forth it is not barely permitted: for where permission is, athe thing is left free. Yea but Mr. G. saith, that recreation is warrantable both by permission and by precept. True by precept in some cases, by permission in other: or by precept in general, by permission in particular, for balls or bowls, and the like. Yea but again Mr. G. saith, (to let the rest pass of Mr. Bs. bBesoms here without bands) that every ⟨p. 259⟩thing indifferent, is lawful, if by rule, and consequently, if you give Mr. B. leave to expound it as he list, by precept. Let me mind Mr. B. what before he told us, it is ca cursed gloss that corrupteth the Text. Doth every Rule necessarily imply a precept? Then belike of things Indifferent, that is, (not, of things neither good nor bad; in which sense my former words cited by Mr. B. jumbling things here together, nothing to the purpose, are to be understood; but) of things neither enjoined nor inhibited, no Rules can be given. But let us try (though it be too palpable) the truth hereof. When the Apostle saith, dA woman is free to marry again if her husband be deceased. Is it not a Rule? Or is it therefore a precept? when he saith, eIf an infidel inviteth you, you may go if you will: for fthat is also implied: and, when you are there, you may eat of all that is set before you without scruple of conscience. Are not these Rules, and yet no precepts? If they be, by Mr. Bs. own grant, Mr. Gs. exception against Mr. Easties proposition standeth good, and the proposition consequently is unsound.