Propositions

101 To know when the use of the doctrine is general, and when particular; which is set down in singular examples, (because we bring our neck out of the yoke, or else tie the mercies of God only to them) three rules are to be observed: First, if we read of any thing in particular, we are to search whether in some other places of the Scriptures, the same thing is not set down generally; that is, whether that which is commended, or discommended in some proper person, be not commanded or forbidden to all; if it be, the use of it is general, not particular; but if it be a particular precept joined to some one, and no warrant found in the word, that it is to be ⟨image 31⟩done of another; then it is a thing personal, proper to some, not general, appertaining to all. The second rule is, that wheresoever there is a general equity of a thing, there is a general practise to be had; howsoever we see it set down but in particular. The third is, wheresoever by the scope of the place there appears a general drift, either by something going before or coming after, though the present place seemeth to be particular, yet there is a general use of the doctrine to be gathered out of it.

101 To knowe when the vse of the doctrine is general, and when particular; which is set downe in singular examples, (because wee bring our necke out of the yoke, or else tie the mercies of God onely to them) three rules ar to be observed: First, if we reade of any thing in particular, wee are to search whether in some other places of the Scriptures, the same thing is not set downe generallie; that is, whether that which is commended, or discommended in some proper person, be not commaunded or forbidden to all; if it be, the vse of it is generall, not particular; but if it bee a particular precept joyned to some one, and noe warrant found in the worde, that it is to bee ⟨image 31⟩done of another; then it is a thing personall, proper to some, not generall, appertaining to all. The second rule is, that wheresoever there is a generall equitie of a thing, there is a generall practise to bee had; howsoever we see it set downe but in particular. The third is, wheresoever by the scope of the place there appeares a generall drift, either by something going before or comming after, though the present place seemeth to bee particular, yet there is a generall vse of the doctrine to be gathered out of it.