A03064:243
A treatise of faith divided into two parts. The first showing the nature, the…A treatise of faith diuided into two parts. The first shewing the nature, the…
A treatise of faith divided into two parts. The first showing the nature, the second, the life of faith. ... By John Ball.A treatise of faith diuided into two parts. The first shewing the nature, the second, the life of faith. ... By Iohn Ball.
London: printed by William Stansby for Edward Brewster, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1§. 3. The seat of faith is the heart, but the heart contrite, humbled, bewailing sin, denying it self, and affected with desire of remission of sins. As the stomach is the place in which meat is received; but it is necessary it be desirous of meat: So the heart is the place, where remission of sins is received and felt, but it must be an heart desirous of, and thirsting after pardon. With the heart man believeth. 2If the Mind and will be two distinct faculties of the soul, then justifying faith is resident in both, but principally in the will: because it assenteth to divine revelation as true, and embraceth the promises as much better then any contrary good, the world, the Devil, or flesh can present to prevent our choice of what it prescribeth for our saving health. For the word of promise not only containing truth, but offering good unto us, cannot fully be received with the understanding, but the will also must move towards it. And so faith is not only a knowledge or assent in the Mind but, a godly affection in the will, which doth go to, embrace, rest upon Christ or the grace offered ⟨p. 143⟩in Christ. Therefore the nature of faith is described by words which signify to stay and roll our selves upon God, to l•ane on him as one would lean upon a staff: and by faith we come unto Christ and receive him. It is objected, that one and the same virtue or grace cannot be in distinct powers and faculties of the soul,3 nor faith in distinct subjects. Whereunto several answers are made, First, that one and the same thing in divers respects may be referred to divers subjects, as these subjects are not altogether separated, but conjoined amongst themselves. So friend-ship is one moral virtue, and yet in the Mind and will both. Love and hatred is noth ng but the affection of good or evil will unto a thing known in the understanding. Our Adversaries themselves place hope in the understanding and the will,4 attributing a double certainty unto it, one in respect of the understanding, another in respect of the will. And so faith being one doth properly possess one subject, to-wit, the soul; but considered according to the two faculties thereof, it possesseth the Mind, as it understandeth and assenteth; the will, as it receiveth embraceth the word of promise.