The unbelievers preparing for Christ. By T.HThe vnbeleevers preparing for Christ. By T.H

The second thing considerable is, how this act of the Will? how this opening of the soul doth discover it self? how a man shall come to know when he wills grace?

The second thing considerable is, how this act of the Will? how this opening of the soule doth discover it selfe? how a man shall come to know when he wills grace?

I answer, that this same turning of the Soul to grace, discovers it self in three particular passages; the first is this: A man is then said to will a thing, when he apprehends the price of a thing, and hath a high esteem of a thing, according to the price of the thing, and the excellency which is in the thing; for it is a rule in natural Philosophy, and reason telleth us thus much, that no man wills a thing, unless he apprehends the thing wch he willeth to be good, either good indeed, or else seemingly good; for no man willeth his own hurt, for if he did nature would destroy it self, every thing therefore desires the preservation of it self, and therefore ⟨p. 33⟩whatsoever is suggested as evil unto the soul of man it will not close with that evil, but turneth from this evil, if it apprehend it as an evil, hence it is that a proud heart loveth proud courses, a covetous heart covetous courses, a malicious heart malicious courses and practises, namely because the soul apprehends these as good though in themselves they be evil, yet the soul takes them to be best for it, now as the soul must apprehend some good in a thing before it can will and desire it, so it must apprehend the excellency of it before it can will it truly, this is that which carrieth the will of a man unto a thing, the will will never otherwise entertain a thing. The 2d.

I answere, that this same turning of the Soule to grace, discovers it selfe in three particular passages; the first is this: A man is then sayd to will a thing, when he apprehends the price of a thing, and hath a high esteeme of a thing, according to the price of the thing, and the excellency which is in the thing; for it is a rule in naturall Philosophy, and reason telleth us thus much, that no man wills a thing, unlesse he apprehends the thing wch he willeth to be good, either good indeed, or else seemingly good; for no man willeth his own hurt, for if he did nature would destroy it selfe, every thing therefore desires the preservation of it selfe, and therefore