An Answer to a Great Number of Blasphemous Cavillations

The same may I say of godly magistrates punishing murderers, adulterers, and blasphemers with death, and yet nether willing the death of any man, neither yet delighting in the shedding of their blood. In these similitudes I grant somewhat to be unlike: for gods power is not subject to such incommodities unwillingly, as be the powers of men. But yet these similitudes suffice to explain the chief purpose, which is that man may will two contraries, for divers respects, without any contrariety in him self. For peace, and war are contraries, to kill, & to save the life, are likewise contraries, and yet one man, even at one time may will both the one, and the other, for divers respects, and divers ends. He may will peace, for the comfortable quietness, and felicity that there of springeth, and at the same instant without all contrariety in him self, he may will war, to withstand the fury of the enemy, that would oppress his subjects. And may not these things, which we perceive to be in creatures, be in God in greater perfection, although we perceive not the causes? Let us try the answer, both by the examples of gods servants, and last by the example of God him self: Lot, no doubt did agree with gods will in that he loved chastity, sobriety and temperance, and hated filthy life riotous cheer, and excess. For the holy Ghost boareth him this record, that he was pure, and clean both in ears, and eyes. But what will had he when he ⟨p. 355⟩did offer his two daughters to be deflowered, and abused by those villainous persons? was it contrary to his former will? Did he now begin to delight in that execrable filthiness? assured I am he did not. But being oppressed with the present necessity, retaining the same love, will, and mind to chastity, and honest conversation, sought the next remedy that to him appeared able to have stayed the rage of that furious multitude (upon God I grant falleth no such necessity). But let the chief scope be observed, and we shall understand (that for divers respects) to will two things, whereof the one, is contrary to the other, is not to will contrariety. But let us come to God him self. God willeth mercy, justice, & all other virtues as before we have said, and these, he will at all times, and before all times. But is it not possible therefore, that he can will cruelty oppression, blood shedding, murder, and death?

The same may I say of godlie magistrates punishing murtherers, adulterers, and blasphemers wt death, and yet nether willing the death of any mā, neither yet deliting in the sheding of their blood. In these similitudes I grāt somwhat to be vnlike: for gods power is not subiect to such incōmodities vnwillingly, as be the powers of men. But yet these similitudes suffice to explaine the chief purpose, wc is yt man may will two contraries, for diuers respectes, without any contrarietie in him self. For peace, and warre are cōtraries, to kill, & to saue the life, are likewise cōtraries, and yet one man, euen at one time may will both the one, and the other, for diuers respectes, and diuers endes. He may will peace, for the cōfortable quietnes, and felicitie yt ther of springeth, and at the same instāt without all cōtrarietie in him self, he may wil warre, to withstād the furie of the ennemie, yt wold oppresse his subiectes. And may not these thinges, wc we perceaue to be in creatures, be in God in greater perfectiō, althogh we perceaue not the causes? Let vs trie the answere, both by the examples of gods seruātes, and last by the exāple of God him self: Lot, no doubte did agree with gods wil in that he loued chastitie, sobrietie and temperāce, and hated filthie life riotous chere, and excesse. For the holy Gost boareth him this record, that he was pure, and cleane both in eares, and eyes. But what will had he when he