Some Divines perceiving that this is an hard sentence, they go about to mitigate it in this sort. The matter, say they, or object of predestination, is a reasonable creature, and that not simply or absolutely considered, but partly as it fell, partly as of it self it was subject to fall: and thereupon God preordaining men from everlasting, considered them, not simply as he was to make them men, but as they were such men as might fall into sin, and again be redeemed by Christ, and after called to the light of the Gospel. The efficient or first motive cause, was not any foreknown cause either this or that, but the mere will of God. For he disposeth all things not of, and by his foreknowledge, but rather according to the same. But these things albeit they may seem to be subtle devises, yet are they not altogether true. Reasons. I. The potter when he purposeth to make some vessel, doth not consider the clay, and regard in it some inherent quality, to make such a vessel, but he maketh it of such and such a form, to this or that use, even of his alone free-will and pleasure. II. Rom. 9.21. Hath not the potter power to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour? In which place we may not understand by the name lump, all mankind corrupted, and fallen, and so to be redeemed in Christ: for then Paul would not have said that God made vessels of wrath, but rather that he did forsake them after they were made. III. This seemeth preposterous, that God did first foreknow mankind, created, fallen, and redeemed in Christ: and that afterward he ordained them so foreknown, to life or to death. For the end is the first thing in the intention of the agent: neither will a most skilful workman first prepare means by which he may be helped to do a thing, before he hath set down in his mind all the ends, both such as are most near, and them that are very far off. Now we know this, that mans creation; and his fall in Adam, are but means to execute Gods predestination, and therefore are subordinate unto it: but the end of Gods ⟨p. 174⟩decree is the manifestation of his glory in saving some, and condemning others. Therefore we may not once imagine that God did first consult of the means whereby he determined to execute his decree, before he deliberated of the election, and reprobation of man.
Some Diuines perceiuing that this is an hard sentence, they goe about to mitigate it in this sort. The matter, say they, or obiect of predestination, is a reasonable creature, and that not simply or absolutely considered, but partly as it fell, partly as of it selfe it was subiect to fall: and thereupon God preordaining men from euerlasting, considered them, not simply as he was to make them men, but as they were such men as might fall into sinne, and againe be redeemed by Christ, and after called to the light of the Gospel. The efficient or first motiue cause, was not any foreknowne cause either this or that, but the meere will of God. For he disposeth all things not of, and by his foreknowledge, but rather according to the same. But these things albeit they may seeme to be subtile deuises, yet are they not altogether true. Reasons. I. The potter when he purposeth to make some vessell, doth not consider the clay, and regard in it some inherent qualitie, to make such a vessell, but he maketh it of such and such a forme, to this or that vse, euen of his alone free-will and pleasure. II. Rom. 9.21. Hath not the potter power to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour, and another to dishonour? In which place we may not vnderstand by the name lumpe, all mankinde corrupted, and fallen, and so to be redeemed in Christ: for then Paul would not haue said that God made vessels of wrath, but rather that he did forsake them after they were made. III. This seemeth preposterous, that God did first foreknow mankind, created, fallen, and redeemed in Christ: and that afterward he ordained them so foreknown, to life or to death. For the ende is the first thing in the intention of the agent: neither will a most skilfull workman first prepare meanes by which he may be helped to doe a thing, before he hath set downe in his minde all the endes, both such as are most neere, and them that are very farre off. Now we know this, that mans creation; and his fall in Adam, are but meanes to execute Gods predestination, and therefore are subordinate vnto it: but the ende of Gods ⟨p. 174⟩decree is the manifestation of his glorie in sauing some, and condemning others. Therefore we may not once imagine that God did first consult of the meanes whereby he determined to execute his decree, before he deliberated of the election, and reprobation of man.
