A Golden Chain

And though God be no cause of mans fall, yet must we not imagine that it came to pass by chance or fortune, whereas the least things that are, come ⟨p. 253⟩to pass with Gods providence. Neither was it by any bare permission without his decree and his will; for that is to make an idle providence: neither did it happen against the will of God, he utterly nilling it: for then it could not have been, unless we deny God to be omnipotent. It remains therefore that this fall did so proceed of the voluntary motion of Adam,¹ as that God did in part ordain and will the permitting of it, not as it was a sin against his commandment, but as it was further in the counsel of God a way to execute his justice and mercy. Against this which I say, divers things are objected. First, that if Adam did that which God in any respect willed, then he did not sin at all. Answ. He that willeth and doth that which God willeth, for all that sins; unless he will it in the same manner with God and for the same end. Now in the permitting of this fact, God intended the manifesting of his glory: but our first parents intending no such thing, sought not only to be like but also to be equal with God. Secondly, it is alleged that Adam could not but fall necessarily if God did decree it. Answ. Adams fall that came not to pass without Gods decree, and therefore in that respect was necessary; was nevertheless in respect of Adams freewill contingent and not necessary: Gods decree not taking away the freedom of will but only ordering it. Lastly, it is alleged that Gods will is the cause of Adams will, and Adams will the cause of his fall, and that therefore Gods will shall be the cause of the fall. Ans. It must be granted that Gods will is a moving cause of the wills of evil men; yet mark how: not as they are evil wills simply, but as they are wills: and therefore when God inclines the evil will of his creature to his good purpose, he is nothing at all entangled with defect or evil of his will.

And though God be no cause of mans fall, yet must we not imagine that it came to passe by chance or fortune, whereas the least things that are, come ⟨p. 253⟩to passe with Gods prouidence. Neither was it by any bare permission without his decree and his will; for that is to make an idle prouidence: neither did it happen against the will of God, he vtterly nilling it: for then it could not haue beene, vnlesse we denie God to be omnipotent. It remaines therefore that this fall did so proceede of the voluntarie motion of Adam,