A Golden Chain

There is also a third action which comes as a mean between the two former,³ which is remissly or in part both to nill and will a thing; whereby though God approve not evil as it is evil, and therefore doth it not: yet he willeth the permitting of it to be done by others, or the being of it; because in respect of God that decreeth the permitting of evil, it is good that there should be evil. And on this manner and no otherwise God willed the fall of Adam: and therefore in the reason of any indifferent man, though he decreed the fall, yet shall he be free from the blame thereof, which lies wholly upon the doer; these two caveats always remembered: first that God by his will did not constrain or force the will of Adam to sin, or infuse into it any corruption; and that ⟨p. 475⟩therefore he sinned willingly and freely, only by the^a necessity of immutability, and not by the necessity of coaction: secondly that God willed the fall for a most worthy end, which was, to lay down a way tending to the manifestation both of justice and mercy. Again, it is alleged that if God willed Adams fall, then his will is flat contrary to it self, because he wills that which he had by express commandment forbidden. Answ. Indeed if God should both will and forbid one and the same thing, in one and the same respect, there should be a contradiction in Gods will: but that God doth not. He forbade Adams fall, as it was sin: for so in every commandment sin as it is sin is condemned and punished: and yet because it was in a new respect, a means of manifesting his glory, who is able to bring light out of darkness; therefore he willingly decreed the permission of it. Incest as it is sin, it is condemned in the seventh commandment, and punished with death: yet as incest was a punishment of Davids adultery, God is said to take his wives and to give them to his son Absalom.³

There is also a third action which comes as a meane betweene the two former,³ which is remissely or in part both to nill and will a thing; wherby though God approoue not euill as it is euill, and therefore doth it not: yet he willeth the permitting of it to be done by others, or the being of it; because in respect of God that decreeth the permitting of euill, it is good that there should be euill. And on this manner and no otherwise God willed the fall of Adam: and therefore in the reason of any indifferent man, though he decreed the fall, yet shall he be free from the blame thereof, which lies wholly vpon the doer; these two caueats alwaies remembred: first that God by his will did not constraine or force the will of Adam to sinne, or infuse into it any corruption; and that