A Golden Chain

I say conscience is a part of the understanding, and I show it thus: God in framing of the soul placed in it two principal faculties, Understanding and Will. Understanding is that faculty in the soul, whereby we use reason: & it is the more principal part, serving to rule & order the whole man; & therefore it is placed in the soul to be as the wagoner in the wagon. The Will is another faculty, whereby we do will or nill any thing• that is, choose or refuse it. With the will is joined sundry affections, as joy, sorrow, love, hatred, &c. whereby we embrace or eschew that which is good or evil. Now, conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but in the understanding; because the actions thereof stand in the use of reason. Understanding again hath two parts. The first is that which stands in the view and contemplation of trueth and falsehood, and goes no further. The second is that which stands in the view and consideration of every particular action, to search whether it be good or bad. The first is called the Theoretical, the second the practical understanding. And under this latter is conscience to be comprehended: because his property is to judge of the goodness or badness of things or actions done.

I say conscience is a part of the vnderstanding, and I shewe it thus: God in framing of the soule placed in it two principall faculties, Vnderstanding and Will. Vnderstāding is that facultie in the soule, wherby we vse reason: & it is the more principall part, seruing to rule & order the whole man; & therfore it is placed in the soule to be as the wagginer in the waggin. The Will is another facultie, whereby wee doe will or nill any thing• that is, choose or refuse it. With the will is ioyned sundrie affectiōs, as ioy, sorrow, loue, hatred, &c. whereby we imbrace or eschewe that which is good or euill. Nowe, conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but in the vnderstanding; because the actions thereof stand in the vse of reason. Vnderstanding againe hath two parts. The first is that which stands in the viewe and contemplation of trueth and falshood, and goes no further. The second is that which standes in the view and consideration of euery particular action, to search whether it be good or badde. The first is called the Theoricall, the second the practicall vnderstanding. And vnder this latter is conscience to be comprehended: because his propertie is to iudge of the goodnes or badnes of things or actions done.