A09365:1370
The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience
The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three books: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundry places, and the other two annexed. Taught and delivered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his own briefs, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelor of Divinity. Whereunto is adjoined a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolved; another of the principal texts of Scripture which are either explained, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.
Cambridge: printed by John Legat, 1606Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legat, 1606
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Lastly, I say that this gift of God, makes a man fit to live well. In which clause standeth the proper effect of Virtue; which is, to make ⟨p. 473⟩those in whom it is, to lead their lives well. And by this we are advertised, to take heed of the opinion of Philosophers, concerning some particular virtues. For in their moral discourses, they give both the name and the nature of Virtue to those things, which are either false & counterfeit virtues, or indeed none at all. For example, Aristotle makes Urbanity a virtue, which is indeed a sin, being nothing else, but a dexterity in mocking and descanting upon reens persons and names: & so it is reckoned by Paul amongst grievous sins and vices, which are to be avoided, Eph. 5. 4. Again, the Philosopher calls Magnanimity (whereby a man thinks himself worthy of great honours, & thereupon enterpriseth great things) a Virtue; which notwithstanding is to be holden a flat vice. For by the law of God, every man is to range himself within the limits of his calling, and not to dare, once to go out of it. Whereas on the contrary, the scope and end of this virtue (as they term it) is to make men to attempt high and great matters above their reach, and so to go beyond their callings. Besides, it is directly opposite to the virtue of humility, which teacheth that a man ought always to be base, vile, & lowly in his own eyes. The Prophet David clears himself of this sin, Psal. 131. 1. when he saith, Lord, I am not high minded, mine eyes are not haughty, I have not walked in things that be ⟨p. 474⟩great, and above my reach. Furthermore, no Virtue must make us to forsake good life, but every one serveth for this end, to make us fit to live a godly life.
Lastly, I say that this gift of God, makes a man fit to liue well. In which clause standeth the proper effect of Vertue; which is, to make ⟨p. 473⟩those in whome it is, to lead their liues well. And by this we are aduertised, to take heede of the opinion of Philosophers, concerning some particular vertues. For in their morall discourses, they giue both the name and the nature of Vertue to those things, which are either false & counterfeit vertues, or indeede none at all. For example, Aristotle makes Vrbanitie a vertue, which is indeede a sinne, beeing nothing els, but a dexteritie in mocking and descanting vpon reens persons and names: & so it is reckoned by Paul amongst grieuous sinnes and vices, which are to be auoided,