A09365:540
The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience
The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three books: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundry places, and the other two annexed. Taught and delivered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his own briefs, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelor of Divinity. Whereunto is adjoined a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolved; another of the principal texts of Scripture which are either explained, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.
Cambridge: printed by John Legat, 1606Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legat, 1606
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, if the world had no beginning, then it hath also no ending. For that which is without beginning, is without ending. Now all things in the world are liable to corruption, and consequently are subject to an end. For whatsoever is corruptible, the same is finite: therefore the world had a beginning.
Againe, if the world had no beginning, then it hath also no ending. For that which is without beginning, is without ending. Now all things in the world are lyable to corruption, and consequently are subiect to an ende. For whatsoeuer is corruptible, the same is finite: therfore the world had a beginning.
Now if it had a beginning; then I demand, how it was made? did it make it self? or was it made of nothing? If it be affirmed, that it made it self, then the world was before it was. If it be said, it came from nothing: that also cannot be. For nothing brings forth nothing: and that which is nothing in it self, cannot bring forth something: therefore it is absurd in reason to say, that nothing brought forth this world. And hereupon it must ⟨p. 206⟩needs remain for a truth, that there was some substance eternal and Almighty that framed this goodly Creature the World, besides it self.
Now if it had a beginning; then I demand, how it was made? did it make it selfe? or was it made of nothing? If it be affirmed, that it made it selfe, then the world was before it was. If it be said, it came from nothing: that also cannot be. For nothing brings forth nothing: and that which is nothing in it selfe, cannot bring forth something: therefore it is absurd in reason to say, that nothing brought forth this world. And hereupon it must ⟨p. 206⟩needes remaine for a truth, that there was some substance eternall and Almightie that framed this goodly Creature the World, besides it selfe.