A09365:77
The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience
The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three books: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundry places, and the other two annexed. Taught and delivered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his own briefs, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelor of Divinity. Whereunto is adjoined a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolved; another of the principal texts of Scripture which are either explained, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.
Cambridge: printed by John Legat, 1606Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legat, 1606
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Sins proceeding from the will, are properly termed voluntary; such as the doer moved by his own will commits, though he know them to be evil. And here, the more free the will is, the greater is the sin: for will added to knowledge, makes the sin the ⟨p. 19⟩greater. Under voluntary sins, are comprehended all such, as proceed from stirred affections; as when a man tells a lie for fear, or striketh another in anger: and the reason is because these offences, though they are not done upon deliberation, but arise from the violence of affection, yet they do not exclude Consent. Hither also we may refer, sins committed by compulsion: as when a man is forced to deny his religion, his offence in deed and in truth is voluntary, (though some otherwise think it to be a mixed action) For compulsion doth not reach to the will, but to the outward man, and serves to draw forth a consent: and and when consent is yielded, he denies his religion voluntarily: for the will cannot be constrained.1
Sinnes proceeding from the will, are properly tearmed voluntarie; such as the doer mooued by his own wil commits, though he know them to be euill. And here, the more free the wil is, the greater is the sinne: for wil added to knowledge, makes the sinne the ⟨p. 19⟩greater. Vnder voluntarie sinnes, are comprehended all such, as proceede from stirred affections; as when a man tells a lie for feare, or striketh another in anger: and the reason is because these offences, though they are not done vpon deliberation, but arise from the violence of affection, yet they doe not exclude Consent. Hither also we may referre, sinnes committed by compulsion: as when a man is forced to denie his religion, his offence in deede and in truth is voluntarie, (though some otherwise think it to be a mixt action) For compulsion doth not reach to the will, but to the outward man, and serues to draw forth a consent: and and when consent is yeelded, he denies his religion voluntarily: for the will cannot be constrained.1
- 1Voluntas n•• cogitur.