Answer. Here the distinction of the double act in reprobation must be repeated and retained. First therefore I answer, that reprobation in regard of the former act is absolute, that is, in regard of the purpose to forsake the creature, and to manifest Justice in it: so we teach, and believe. For we cannot so much as imagine a cause in ⟨p. 34⟩the creature, why it was Gods will to pass by it, and to suffer some to fall finally from their blessed estate. Yea sin is it self after the desertion and just permission of God: and therefore it can by no means be the cause of the permission and desertion. Whence it is that Lombard the 1Master of all the Schoolmen saith, that God hath rejected whom he would, not for any future merits which he did foresee, but yet most righteously, though we cannot conceive the reason thereof. And Jerome long before him doth thus expound y• place of Paul, 2Rom. 9. 11. (Ere the children were borne, and when they had neither done good nor evil) If Esau (saith he) and Jacob were not yet borne, neither had done good or evil, whereby they might win•• Gods favour or offend him, and if their election and rejection doth not show their several deserts, but the will of the Elector and Rejector, what shall we say? Afterwards: If we grant this, that God doth what soever he will, and that he either chooseth or condemneth a man without desert and works: it is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. Again: Therefore it is in ⟨p. 35⟩vain asked—, seeing that it is in his power and will either to choose or to refuse a man without good and evil works. Anselmus: It 3is not ours to know why God deemeth grace to them which would gladly receive and consent to grace, and neglecteth another, that would so well consent unto it. This is only 4known ••to God. Again, No creature is able to search out why he is merciful to this man rather than to another. xThomas: Why he electeth these unto glory, and rejecteth those, he hath •o reason but the divine will. Again, The difference of those which are to be saved, from them that are to be damned proceedeth from the principal •••ention of the first Ag[…] Again, We […] not enquire why he converteth these and not those. For this cometh of his own mere will. And Augustine ⟨p. 36⟩upon John:
Answere. Here the distinction of the double act in reprobation must bee repeated and retained. First therefore I answere, that reprobation in regard of the former act is absolute, that is, in regard of the purpose to forsake the creature, and to manifest Iustice in it: so we teach, and beleeue. For we cannot so much as imagine a cause in ⟨p. 34⟩the creature, why it was Gods wil to passe by it, and to suffer some to fall finally from their blessed estate. Yea sinne is it selfe after the desertion and iust permission of God: and therefore it can by no meanes be the cause of the permission and desertion. Whence it is that Lumbard the 1Master of all the Schoolemen saith, that God hath reiected whom he would, not for any future merits which he did foresee, but yet most righteously, though we cannot conceiue the reason thereof. And Ierome long before him dothd thus expound y• place of Paul, 2Rom. 9. 11. (Ere the children were borne, and whē they had neither done good nor euill) If Esau (saith hee) and Iacob were not yet borne, neither had done good or euill, whereby they might win•• Gods fauour or offend him, and if their election and reiection doth not shew their seuerall deserts, but the will of the Elector and Reiector, what shal we say? Afterwards: If we grant this, that God doth what soeuer hee will, and that he either chuseth or condemneth a man without desert and workes: it is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercie. Againe: Therefore it is in ⟨p. 35⟩vaine asked—, seeing that it is in his power and will either to chuse or to refuse a man without good and euill workes. Anselmus: It 3is not ours to know why God demeth grace to them which would gladly receiue and consent to grace, and neglecteth another, that would so well consent vnto it. This is onely 4knowne ••to God. Againe, No creature is able to search out why he is mercifull to this man rather than to another. x
- 1Lib. 1. dist. 41.
- 2Ad Hebid. quaest. 10.
- 3Comment. in Math. c. 11.
- 4In Rom. cap. 11.
- xThe same do other Summ. 1. par. quae. 23. art. 5. Schoolmen affirm in •e midst of Papacy. Gregorius Ariminensis layeth down six conclusions concerning Predestination. First, that there is no body predestinated for the well using of freewill, which God foreknew that he should have. Secondly, that no man is predestinated, because he was foreknown to continue to the end without Cont. Gent. lib. 1. c. 44. any let of habitual grace. 3. That whomsoever God predestinated, ••m he did predestinate freely, purposedlie and of his pure mercy. Fourthly, that no man is rejected for the evil using of freewill, which God foresaw he would be tainted with. Fifthly, that there is not any rejected, because he was foreknown to have finally an impediment of divine grace. Sixthly, that whomsoever God rejected, him he did reject without any cause in him. The very same conclusions hath Petrus de Alliaco, lib. 1. sent. quaest. 12. art. 2. and Marsilius of Inghen, lib. 1. dist. 42. q. 4. Some of whose words I will set down: He is predestinated (saith he) to whom God hath purposed to give everlasting life. And he is rejected, on whom God hath determined not to bestow the same, as the Apostle teacheth, Rom. 9. Again: No man, that is predestinated, is predestinated for any thing, which should be in him in time to come: so also there is no reprobate rejected for any cause, which was to be in him in time to come. And every one that is predestinate, is predestinated only by grace, & by Gods merciful disposition, not for any cause either actual or privative to be found in him, whiles he liveth. Again, To reject is to nill to show mercy, and this is not for the evil works of In sent. lib. 1. quae. 22. art. 2. any creature, for how holy soever the works were, God would show mercy as he listed. So also Francis. Mar. lib. x. q. 31. art. 2. 3. saith, that there are four signs necessary for the understanding of the proceeding of predestination and reprobation: First, in which Peter & Judas are offered to the divine will, as to neither of them both. And •hen the divine will […] preordain Pter unto glie, but it had no posine act about Judas, according to Augustine. The second sign is, in which he preordained Peter to grace: and thē he had o positive act as yet about Judas. The thd sign […]. in which they are left to themselves, and bot o them do fall into sin. The fourth sign is that, in which Peter riseth again, or he cannot continue, because he is predestinated by the first sign. But Judas riseth not again, because he hath not God to raise him up, therefore he is rejected. D. Bannes in 1. Thom. q. 23. The cause and reason of the whole work of reprobation cannot be said to be in the reprobates, for sin it self cannot be the cause of that pennission of sin, for which a man is damned, whether it be original or actual, as it appeareth in infants who die only with original sin: which verily, howsoever it may be the cause why infants are forsaken in it, yet nevertheless it cannot be the cause and reason, why the whole nature of man should be suffered to fall in Adam. And Ferrariensis (in Thom. cont. Gent. pag 603.) saith, that four things are found in a reprobate; to wi, a sufferance to fall into sin, the sin it self, Gods forsaking not raising him from sin, and the punishment or damnation. Now reprobation is not alike but diversly affected to all these. For if we consider sin in it self, reprobation is not caused by i—.Although nothing on our parts, to wit, no work of ours be the cause of the whole work of reprobatiō (for of all these together, namely, of the permission, forsaking and punishment, the manifestation of Gods justice is the alone cause, considering that no work of ours is the cause of the permission) yet notwithstanding our wicked working or sin is the cause why we are damned and punished. Again, We deny that God is cruel, for we say that God doth not punish and torment the reprobate for the fulfilling (as it were) of his own fancy, but for sin eternally foreknown, which he determined so to dispose of by punishing of it, that his justice might be made manifest.