A discourse of conscience wherein is set down the nature, properties, and differences thereofA discourse of conscience wherein is set downe the nature, properties, and differences thereof

I say conscience is a part of the understanding, and I show it thus. God in framing of the soul placed in it two principal faculties, Understanding and Will. Understanding is that faculty in the sole whereby we use reason: and it is the more principal part serving to rule and order the whole man, and therefore it is placed in the soul to be as the wagoner in the wagon. The Will is an other faculty, whereby we do will or nill any thing, that is, choose or refuse it. With the will is joined sundry affections, as joy, sorrow, love, ha••ed, &c. ⟨p. 2⟩whereby we embrace or eschew that which is good or evil. Now, conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but in the understanding, because the actions thereof stand in the use of reason. Understanding again hath two parts. The first is that which stands in the view and contemplation of truth and falsehood, and goes no further. The second is that which stands in the view and consideration of every particular action, to search whether it be good or bad. The first is called the Theoretical, the second the practical understanding. And under this latter is conscience to be comprehended: because his property is to judge of the goodness or badness of things or actions done.

I say conscience is a part of the vnderstanding, and I shew it thus. God in framing of the soule placed in it two principall faculties, Vnderstanding and Will. Vnderstanding is that facultie in the soale whereby we vse reason: and it is the more principall part seruing to rule and order the whole man, and therefore it is placed in the soule to be as the wagginer in the waggin. The Will is an other facultie, whereby we doe will or nill any thing, that is, choose or refuse it. With the will is ioyned sundrie affections, as ioy, sorrow, loue, ha••ed, &c. ⟨p. 2⟩whereby we imbrace or eschew that which is good or euill. Now, conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but in the vnderstanding, because the actions thereof stand in the vse of reason. Vnderstanding againe hath two parts. The first is that which stands in the view and contemplation of truth and falshood, and goes no further. The second is that which stands in the view and consideration of euery particular action, to search whether it be good or badde. The first is called the Theorical, the second the practical vnderstanding. And vnder this latter is conscience to be comprehended: because his propertie is to iudge of the goodnes or badnes of things or actions done.