A09400:14
A discourse of conscience wherein is set down the nature, properties, and differences thereofA discourse of conscience wherein is set downe the nature, properties, and differences thereof
A discourse of conscience wherein is set down the nature, properties, and differences thereof: as also the way to get and keep good conscience.A discourse of conscience wherein is set downe the nature, properties, and differences thereof: as also the way to get and keepe good conscience.
Cambridge: printed by John Legate, 1596Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legate, 1596
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again I say that conscience is a bpart of the mind or understanding, to show that conscience is not a bare knowledge or judgement of the understanding (as cmen commonly write) but a natural power, faculty, or created quality from whence knowledge and judgement proceed as effects. This the Scriptures confirm in that they ascribe sundry works and actions to conscience, as accusing, excusing, comforting, terrifying. Which actions could not thence proceed, if conscience were no more but an action or act of the mind. Indeed I grant, it may be taken for a certain actual knowledge, ⟨p. 3⟩which is the effect thereof: but to speak properly, this knowledge must proceed of a power in the soul, the property whereof is to take the principles and conclusions of the mind and apply them, & by applying either to accuse or excuse. This is the ground of all, and this I take to be conscience. If it be objected that conscience cannot be a natural power, because it may be lost: I answer if conscience be lost, it is only in respect of the use thereof, as reason is lost in the drunken man, and not otherwise.
Againe I say that conscience is a bpart of the minde or vnderstanding, to shewe that conscience is not a bare knowledge or iudgement of the vnderstanding (as cmen commonly write) but a naturall power, facultie, or created qualitie from whence knowledge and iudgement proceede as effects. This the Scriptures confirme in that they ascribe sundrie workes and actions to conscience, as accusing, excusing, comforting, terrifying. Which actions could not thence proceede, if conscience were no more but an action or act of the minde. Indeede I graunt, it may be taken for a certen actuall knowledge, ⟨p. 3⟩which is the effect thereof: but to speake properly, this knowledge must proceede of a power in the soule, the propertie whereof is to take the principles and conclusions of the minde and applie thē, & by applying either to accuse or excuse. This is the ground of all, and this I take to be conscience. If it be obtected that conscience cannot be a naturall power, because it may be lost: I answer if conscience be lost, it is onely in respect of the vse thereof, as reason is lost in the drunken man, and not otherwise.