A09403:38
Hepieíkeia: or, a treatise of Christian equity and moderation. Delivered publicly in lecturesHepieíkeia: or, a treatise of Christian equitie and moderation. Deliuered publikely in lectures
Hepieíkeia: or, a treatise of Christian equity and moderation. Delivered publicly in lectures by M. W. Perkins, and now published by the consent of his assigns in Cambridge by a preacher of the wordHepieíkeia: or, a treatise of Christian equitie and moderation. Deliuered publikely in lectures by M. W. Perkins, and now published by the consent of his assignes in Cambridge by a preacher of the word
Cambridge: printed by John Legat, 1604Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legat, 1604
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now besides this, there is a second thing in the hand of the Magistrate, namely the moderation, relaxation, or mitigation of this extremity: and that is, when the proper form of the words, and the strictest meaning of the law is not urged, and the punishment ⟨p. 10⟩prescribed in the law, is moderated, or lessened, or deferred, or (it may be) remitted, upon good and sufficient reason; and in such cases, as whereof the law speaks not directly, nor the law-maker did purposely aim at. The ground of this mitigation is, because no law makers being men, can foresee, or set down, all cases that may fall out. Therefore when the case altereth, then must the discretion of the lawmaker show it self, and do that, which the law cannot do.
Now besides this, there is a second thing in the hand of the Magistrate, namely the moderation, relaxation, or mitigation of this extremitie: and that is, when the proper forme of the wordes, and the strictest meaning of the law is not vrged, and the punishment ⟨p. 10⟩prescribed in the law, is moderated, or lessened, or deferred, or (it may be) remitted, vpon good and sufficient reason; and in such cases, as whereof the lawe speakes not directly, nor the law-maker did purposely aime at. The ground of this mittigation is, because no lawe makers beeing men, can foresee, or set downe, all cases that may fall out. Therefore when the case altereth, then must the discretion of the lawemaker shew it selfe, and doe that, which the law cannot doe.
This mitigation is in the hand of the Magistrate, as well as the extremity: nay it is a part of his duty as well as the former: and he offends as well, that neglects to mitigate the extremity, when just occasion is: as he that neglects to execute the extremity, when there is need. As therefore, he is no way fit to be a Judge, who hath no knowledge, or care to execute the law: so he is but half a Judge, who can do nothing but urge the law, and the plain words of the law, and is not able also, to mitigate the rigour of of the law, when need so requireth. Therefore every Magistrate, is to practise