Now having thus considered these two together, here upon we may see what this public equity is, namely nothing else, but a moderation and mitigation of the extremity of a law, upon honest and convenient reasons, and in such cases, as were not directly intended in the law. The observation and due practise of this equity, is the glory, credit and honour of all public assemblies, as assizes, sessions and all courts of justice, and without the observation of this when need is, all that they do is flat injustice in that case. For they lame and maim the law, they fulfil but the one part of the law: for in every law there are these two things; the extremity in plain terms, and the mitigation implied: and these two together make the law perfect: and the glory of the law, stands as well in practising of mitigation, as in the execution of extremity, nay sometime ⟨p. 15⟩it stands in the mitigation, and not in the extremity, insomuch as the moderation is then the equity of the law, and the extremity is more injustice. And as this is the glory of the law, so is it the glory of Judges and Magistrates, thus to execute the laws, and to temper them with such discretion, as neither too much mitigation, do abolish the law, nor too much extremity leave no place for mitigation. Therefore (to make an end of this point) two sorts of men are here reprovable. First such men, as by a certain foolish kind of pity, are so carried away, that would have nothing but mercy, mercy, and would have all punishments, forfeitures, penalties, either quite taken away, and remitted, or at least lessoned, and moderated, they would also have the extremity of the law executed on no man. This is the high way to abolish laws, and consequently to pull down authority, and so in the end to open a door to all confusion, disorder, and to all licentiousness of life. But I need not to say much herein, for there are but few that offend in this kind, mans nature being generally ⟨p. 16⟩inclined, rather to cruelty then to mercy: This fault proceedeth either from a weakness of wit, and an effeminateness of mind; and then a man is unfit to be a Judge; or else from vain glory, and a base and affected popularity, and such a man is unworthy to be a Judge.
Now hauing thus considered these two together, here vpon we may see what this publicke equitie is, namely nothing els, but a moderation and mittigation of the extremitie of a law, vpon honest and conuenient reasons, and in such cases, as were not directly intended in the law. The obseruation and due practise of this equitie, is the glorie, credit and honour of all publicke assemblies, as assises, sessions and all courts of iustice, and without the obseruation of this when need is, all that they do is flat iniustice in that case. For they lame and maime the lawe, they fulfill but the one part of the lawe: for in euery lawe there are these two thinges; the extremitie in plain tearmes, and the mittigation implied: and these two together make the lawe perfect: and the glory of the lawe, standes as well in practising of mittigation, as in the execution of extremitie, nay sometime ⟨p. 15⟩it standes in the mittigation, and not in the extremitie, insomuch as the moderation is then the equitie of the lawe, and the extremitie is more iniustice. And as this is the glory of the lawe, so is it the glory of Iudges and Magistrates, thus to execute the lawes, and to temper them with such discretion, as neither too much mittigation, do abolish the law, nor too much extremitie leaue no place for mittigation. Therefore (to make an end of this point) two sortes of men are here reproueable. First such men, as by a certain foolish kind of pittie, are so carried away, that would haue nothing but mercy, mercy, and would haue all punnishments, forfaitures, penalties, either quite taken away, and remitted, or at least lessoned, and moderated, they would also haue the extremitie of the lawe executed on no man. This is the high way to abolish lawes, and consequently to pull downe authoritie, and so in the end to open a dore to all confusion, disorder, and to all licentiousnes of life. But I need not to say much herein, for there are but few that offend in this kind, mans nature beeing generally ⟨p. 16⟩inclined, rather to crueltie then to mercie: This fault proceedeth either from a weakenes of witt, and an effeminatenes of minde; and then a man is vnfit to be a Iudge; or else from vaine glorie, and a base and affected popularitie, and such a man is vnworthy to be a Iudge.
