A09411:726
An exposition of the Symbol or Creed of the Apostles according to the tenor…An exposition of the Symbole or Creed of the Apostles according to the tenour…
An exposition of the Symbol or Creed of the Apostles according to the tenor of the Scriptures, and the consent of orthodox Fathers of the Church. By William Perkins.An exposition of the Symbole or Creed of the Apostles according to the tenour of the Scriptures, and the consent of orthodoxe Fathers of the Church. By William Perkins.
Cambridge: printed by John Legatt, 1595Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legatt, 1595
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Predestination may thus be defined: It is a part of the counsel of God, whereby he hath before all times purposed in him self to show mercy on some men, and to pass by others, showing his justice on them for the manifestation of the glory of his own name. First, I say, it is a part of his counsel, because the counsel or decree of God, universally extends it self to all things that are: and Predestination is Gods decree so far forth as it concerns the reasonable creatures, especially man. Now in every purpose or decree of God, three things must be considered; the beginning, the matter, the end. The beginning is the will of God whereby he willeth and appointeth the estate of his creatures: and it is the most absolute, supreme, and sovereign cause of all things that are, so far forth as they are: having nothing either above it self or out of it self, to be an impulsive cause to move or incline it; and to say otherwise, is to make the will of God to be no will. Indeed mens wills are moved & disposed by external causes, out of themselves borrowed from the things whereof deliberation is made, because they are to be ruled by equity and reason: and a mans bare will without reason is nothing. Now Gods will is not ruled by any other rule of reason or justice, but it self is an absolute rule both of justice and reason. A thing is not first of all reasonable & just, & then afterward willed by god: bu• it is first of all willed by God & thereupon it becomes ⟨p. 424⟩reasonable and just. The manner of his purpose is a decreed manifestation of two of the most principal attributes of the godhead, mercy and justice: & that with a limitation or restraint of mercy to some of the creatures, & justice to some others, because it was his good will and pleasure. And we are not to imagine that this is a point of cruelty in God: for his very essence or nature is not justice alone, or mercy alone, but justice and mercy both together: and therefore to purpose the declaration of them both upon his creatures over whom he is a sovereign Lord; & that without other respects, upon his very will & pleasure is no point of injustice. The supreme end of the counsel of God is the manifestation of his own glory partly in his mercy, & partly in his justice.
Predestination may thus be defined: It is a parte of the counsell of God, whereby hee hath before all times purposed in him selfe to shevve mercie on some men, and to passe by others, shevving his iustice on them for the manifestation of the glorie of his ovvne name. First, I say, it is a parte of his counsell, because the counsell or decree of God, universally extends it selfe to all things that are: and Predestination is Gods decree so farre foorth as it concernes the reasonable creatures, especially man. Now in euery purpose or decree of God, three things must be considered; the beginning, the matter, the ende. The beginning is the will of God whereby he willeth and appointeth the estate of his creatures: and it is the most absolute, supreme, and soueraigne cause of all things that are, so farre foorth as they are: having nothing either aboue it selfe or out of it selfe, to be an impulsiue cause to mooue or incline it; and to say otherwise, is to make the will of God to be no will. Indeede mens willes are mooued & disposed by externall causes, out of themselues borrowed from the things whereof deliberation is made, because they are to be ruled by equitie and reason: and a mans bare will without reason is nothing. Now Gods will is not ruled by any other rule of reason or iustice, but it selfe is an absolute rule both of iustice and reason. A thing is not first of al reasonable & iust, & thē afterward willed by god: bu it is first of all willed by God & thereupon it becoms