An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the…An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the…

There remaineth a third, that he suffer something to come to pass, which he willeth it be either done or not done, as that be careth not whether it be done or no. But who knoweth not that this doctrine is Epicurious? Furthermore, who I pray thee, besides thee alone, knoweth not, that the omnipotency of God standeth not only in this, that be can do what he list, but in this also, that all the power and strength of all inferior causes dependeth of him? But whence is this strength, but from a willing God? For neither can it be wrested from the beginning, neither proceed nor issue, as out of the hands of an idle God, that inferior causes should be enforced, not by his, but by their own determination. For I deny not, but that the instruments are in deed enforced, which are endued with will, according to their own liking, but because it is carried to the end ordained of God. For because (as Augustine hath excellently and truly written) the will of God is the necessity of things, nor that Stoical, which thou falsely objectest against us, but which taketh not away the voluntary moving of will, as the same writer hath plainly manifested in his books, entitled of the City of God. Therefore when thou sayest that God nilling,¹ but suffering, the limits may be passed which he hath set, thou either spoilest him of his omnipotency, or makest him light and inconstant, and finally, contrary to himself. But this thy blasphemy, even all dumb creatures do reprehend with open mouth, which have continued so many thousand years in their estate: & they plainly confess, that they cannot pass the breadth of a line, except he will and commandeth. The strength of I straell will not deceive, (saith Samuel) nor will be removed with repentance, seeing he is not a man, that he can repent. And Paul saith, it is not possible, that the word of God should fall away. But it must needs fall away in ⟨p. 145⟩some part, if any thing, yea, even the least, be done beside his will, yea, even of those which he doth not simply allow. But what do I bring these witnesses? for Balaam himself that hireling Prophet doth reprove thee, GOD is no man that he should lye,² (saith he) nor the Son of man, that he should repent. Doth he say, and not do? or speak, and not make good?

There remaineth a thirde, that he suffer something to come to passe, whiche he willeth it be either done or not done, as that be careth not whether it be done or no. But who knoweth not that this doctrine is Epicurious? Furthermore, who I praye thée, besides thée alone, knoweth not, that ye omnipotencie of God standeth not only in this, that be can do what he liste, but in this also, that all the power and strength of all inferioure causes dependeth of him? But whence is this strength, but from a willing God? For neither can it be wreasted from the beginning, neither procéede nor issue, as out of the hands of an ydle God, that inferior causes shoulde be enforced, not by his, but by their owne determination. For I denye not, but that the instruments are in déede enforced, which are endeued wyth will, according to their owne liking, but bycause it is carried to the ende ordained of God. For bycause (as Augustine hathe excellently and truely written) the will of God is the necessitie of things, nor that Stoycall, which thou falsely obiectest against vs, but which taketh not awaye the voluntarie mouing of will, as the same writer hath plainely manifested in his bookes, entituled of the Cittie of God. Therefore when thou sayste that God nilling,