An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the…An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the…

And it is no consequent, that if the order of all causes be certain to God, therefore there is nothing in the determination of our will. And they even our wills are in the order of causes, which is certain to God, and is held in his foreknowledge, because also mens wills are the causes of mens works. Also in the same place, our wills are available so much, how much God would they should be available, and foreknew it, and therefore whatsoever they can, they can it truly, and whatsoever themselves shall do, they shall utterly do it, because he foreknew they should can and do, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived. And again, if that be defined to be necessity, according to the which we say it is of necessity that something be so or be so done.¹ I know not wherefore we should fear it, least it take from us the freedom of will. Hitherto I have reported the words of Augustine, and what Calvin thinketh of necessity and casuals, it plainly appeareth by his own words. For when he had taught out of the word of God, that God directeth with his counsels those things which seem most casual, and had showed that as Augustine once, so also himself is much unworthily charged with the Slander of Stoical Destiny. At the last he addeth these, farewell the Stoics with their Destiny: ⟨p. 232⟩to us let the free will of God be governor of all things, but that casuals be taken out of the world, doth seem• absurd. I let pass the distinctions which are used in Schools, that which I will bring, shall be in my judgement simple, and in no wise forced, and also applied to the benefit of life. So is it of necessity that that come to pass which God hath determined, that yet it neither be precisely nor of his own nature necessary. I have a familiar example in the bones of Christ. The Scripture witnesseth, that Christ put upon himself a body utterly like ours, wherefore to grant that he had bones, that might be broken, no wise man will doubt. But there seemeth to me to be another question, and that apart, whether any bone of his could be broken, for it was requisite of necessity, that they all remain whole and unhurt, because it was so determined by the immovable decree of God. But I speak not so as of the customary kinds of speaking of necessity by his mean or absolute.

And it is no consequente, that if the order of all causes be certayne to God, therefore there is nothyng in the determination of oure wyll. And they euen our willes are in the order of causes, whyche is certayne to God, and is helde in his foreknowledge, bycause also mens willes are the causes of mens workes. Also in the same place, oure willes are auayleable so muche, howe muche God woulde they shoulde be auaileable, and foreknewe it, and therefore whatsoeuer they can, they can it truly, and whatsoeuer themselues shall doe, they shall vtterlie doe it, bycause he foreknewe they shoulde can and doe, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceyued. And againe, if that be defined to be necessitie, according to the whiche we say it is of necessitie that something bée so or be so done.