An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the…An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the…

For they are no more indeterminate, as to write, or not to write, is casual. But if thou write already, it is no more casual, but of necessity. Therefore we say, the knowledge of senses is certain, because the very things can not be are themselves otherwise. But also things may be considered as they are secret in their causes, And for that the causes, are sometimes of power, sometimes not of power to bring forth effects, therefore there is no necessary working force in them. But if the things themselves be referred to God, there is a far other reason. For he calleth those things which are not, as though they were. For because he compasseth all time, & hath neither beginning nor ending, also all things which shall be hereafter by time indeterminable, are yet present to him. Hereto also cometh the will of God. For bare knowledge hath no place in him, but [Greek or Hebrew] working. And by this means, I say, that things themselves have the manner of necessity. August upon Genes. to the Let. in the 6. book. 15. Chap. There be many means, by which, man, & other things might be made of God: & those means had some possibility, not necessity. This also is of the will of God, whose will is the necessity of things. And albeit such things being referred to God are of necessity, yet we are to esteem them of the interior & proper cause, & to term them Casuals. For it is of necessity, ye such as is the efficient cause, such be also the effect. If thou demandest why these two kinds of causes be in the nature of things, & some limited & necessary, & some infinite and casual, there can be answered no other thing, than, that God hath enjoined these orders to all things. And God produceth, limiteth, and boundeth all things, yet not that he might confound & dispense the nature of things.

For they are no more indeterminate, as to write, or not to write, is casuall. But if thou write alreadie, it is no more casuall, but of necessitie. Therfore we say, the knowlege of senses is certaine, bycause ye very things can not be are themselues otherwise. But also things maye be cōsidered as they are secret in their causes, And for that ye causes, are somtimes of power, somtimes not of power to bring forth effects, therfore there is no necessary working force in thē. But if ye things thēselues be referred to God, there is a far other reasō. For he calleth those things whiche are not, as thoughe they were. For bycause he cōpasseth al time, & hath neither beginning nor ending, also all things whiche shall be hereafter by time indeterminable, are yet present to him. Hereto also cōmeth ye will of God. For bare knowlege hath no place in him, but 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 working. And by this means, I say, that things thēselues haue ye maner of necessitie. August vpon Genes. to ye Let. in ye 6. booke. 15. Chap. There be many means, by which, man, & other things might be made of God: & those means had some possibilitie, not necessitie. This also is of the wil of God, whose will is the necessitie of thinges. And albeit such things being referred to God are of necessitie, yet we are to oftéeme thē of the interior & proper cause, & to terme thē Casualls. For it is of necessitie, ye such as is ye efficient cause, such be also the effect. If thou demaūdest why these two kindes of causes be in the nature of things, & some limited & necessarie, & some infinite and casual, there can be answered no other thing, than, that God hathe enioyned these orders to al things. And God produceth, limiteth, and boundeth all things, yet not that hée might confound & dispecse the nature of things.