An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the…An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the…

But farther also, let us see how that vain reason of man doth dispatch it self, for not even that same which a little before enforceth us to judge otherwise of the end of man, than the word of God may suffer, judge if to be most foolish, that that should not be lawful to God the Creator, in creating whatsoever things, which all men grant to the Potter in making his vessels: for truly God doth far more exceed his Angels, than the Potter his Clay. But I also demand this of thee, ¹[Greek or Hebrew] most reasonable creature, doth God seem to thee always like himself, & omnipotent? I think he doth, how is it then ye thou admittest that ordinance, which once being set, he can neither be always like himself, nor almighty? For if he created all men with that purpose that he might sane all, why doth he not sane them? is it because he will not now sane those ⟨p. 257⟩whom he made in the beginning? Then he hath changed his will, and hath indeed repented him of his purpose. Or is it because he cannot sane them? then he cannot be almighty. But what manner of godhead is this, which is neither always like himself, nor can do whatsoever he will. Finally, see how the latter may agree with the first. Thou saidst, that God was ready to forgive, and slow to wrath. But if his counsel had been ratified, in deed what manner of counsel doest thou say it was, in respect of men there should have bin no place left to this his nature. Nature and Will therefore do contend in God. For his nature is to use mercy and wrath, which his will should not have suffered him to do. For, what place had there bin, either for wrath or mercy, if he had crowned all men with eternal life in Adam? The truth therefore is thus. Albeit, that the Lord doth advance his glory in manifesting both his mercy and wrath: yet so he created man, to the end, that in that lining creature especially, he might manifest both the one and the other. He therefore created him just, for how should he do otherwise, which is altogether good? nor otherwaies he could have justly condemned evil, if he had bin the Author of evil: but with that condition, that shortly of his own will (for he was endued with will) and therefore by his own fault, he might decline from his creator, and might carry headlong into the same ruinous downfall, all those which were included in him.

But farther also, let vs sée how that vayne reason of man doth dispatch it selfe, for not euen that same whyche a little before enforceth vs to iudge otherwise of the ende of man, than the worde of God may suffer, iudge if to be most foolish, that that should not be lawfull to God the Creator, in creating whatsoeuer things, whiche all men graunt to the Potter in making his vessels: for trulie God dothe farre more excéede his Angels, than the Potter his Clay. But I also demaunde this of thée,