The creatures indeed desire things, because they are good; and love them, because they are pleasant; because they seek for perfection out of themselves, because they are caused by that which is out of themselves: but this is not so in God, who is the first cause, because, of the first cause there is no cause; and of the first reason there is no reason to be given. Look whatsoever is in the creature, what justice or excellency, it comes from God; and if he should will any thing for this cause; because it is good, there should be a reciprocation, which is impossible. I speak this for this end; that in our judging of the ways of God, we should take heed of framing a model of our own, as to think, because such a thing is just; therefore the Lord wills it: the reason of this conceit is, because we think that God must go by our rule; we forget this, that every thing is just because he wills it; it is not that God wills it, because it is good or just. But we should proceed after another manner, we should find out what the will of God is; for in that is the rule of justice and equity; for otherwise it was possible that the Lord could err, though he did never ⟨p. 144⟩err: that which goes by a rule, though it doth not swerve, yet it may; but if it be the rule it self, it is impossible to err. As, if the Carpenters hand be the rule, he strikes a right line. The Angels and creatures have a rule, and therefore may err; but it is not so with God, and therefore what God wills is just, because he is the rule it self; therefore in the mysteries of predestination, we are to say thus with our selves; Thus I find the Lord hath set it down, thus he hath expressed himself in his Word, such is his pleasure; and therefore it is reason, and just such against which there can be no exception.
The creatures indeed desire things, because they are good; and love them, because they are pleasant; because they seeke for perfection out of themselves, because they are caused by that which is out of themselves: but this is not so in God, who is the first cause, because, of the first cause there is no cause; and of the first reason there is no reason to be given. Looke whatsoever is in the creature, what justice or excellencie, it comes from God; and if he should will any thing for this cause; because it is good, there should be a reciprocation, which is impossible. I speake this for this end; that in our judging of the waies of God, we should take heed of framing a modell of our owne, as to thinke, because such a thing is just; therefore the Lord wils it: the reason of this conceit is, because we thinke that God must goe by our rule; we forget this, that every thing is just because he wils it; it is not that God wils it, because it is good or just. But we should proceed after another manner, wee should finde out what the will of God is; for in that is the rule of justice and equity; for otherwise it was possible that the Lord could erre, though he did never ⟨p. 144⟩erre: that which goes by a rule, though it doth not swarve, yet it may; but if it be the rule it selfe, it is impossible to erre. As, if the Carpenters hand be the rule, he strikes a right line. The Angels and creatures have a rule, and therefore may erre; but it is not so with God, and therefore what God wils is just, because he is the rule it selfe; therefore in the mysteries of predestination, we are to say thus with our selves; Thus I finde the Lord hath set it downe, thus he hath expressed himselfe in his Word, such is his pleasure; and therefore it is reason, and just such against which there can be no exception.
