A09977:625
Life eternalLife eternall
Life eternal or, A treatise of the knowledge of the divine essence and attributes Delivered in XVIII. sermons. By the late faithful and worthy minister of Jesus Christ, John Preston, D. in Divinity, chaplain in ordinary to his Majesty, master of Emmanuel College in Cambridge, and sometimes preacher of Lincolns Inn.Life eternall or, A treatise of the knowledge of the divine essence and attributes Delivered in XVIII. sermons. By the late faithfull and worthy minister of Iesus Christ, Iohn Preston, D. in Divinity, chaplaine in ordinary to his Majestie, master of Emmanuel Colledge in Cambridge, and sometimes preacher of Lincolns Inne.
London: printed by Richard, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thirdly, It must be often renewed. First, I say, there must be some reason that must move him: but if that were all, he would not resolve, ⟨p. 118⟩therefore he must have an inclination of the will to it; both these, when they concur, they make the resolution up: when the understanding is convinced, and the will inclined, the understanding saith there is reason for it, and the will saith, it is good, then this makes up the resolution. As first, when a man hath any reason to move him to any action, and it is a strong reason, so that he answers all objections that he meets with, now the resolution continues firm: but if his reasons be not sufficient, but he meet with objections that are stronger, then the first principle being taken away, the resolution grows flaggy and weak. And so is it in the other also, when a man hath a desire to any thing, if it be so strong, that nothing is stronger then it, that can overtop, and overrule it, then he goes on without any impediment: but if it be weak, so that a stronger desire can come, and overbalance it, then the second principle is demolished, and there is an end of this resolution. So that let the reason on which we fix it be strong, and let the inclination (which must concur,) be fixed and strong, and then the resolution will be according.
Thirdly, It must be often renewed. First, I say, there must be some reason that must move him: but if that were all, he would not resolue, ⟨p. 118⟩therefore hee must have an inclination of the will to it; both these, when they concurre, they make the resolution up: when the understanding is convinced, and the will inclined, the understanding saith there is reason for it, and the will saith, it is good, then this makes up the resolution. As first, when a man hath any reason to move him to any action, and it is a strong reason, so that hee answers all objections that hee meets with, now the resolution continues firme: but if his reasons be not sufficient, but he meete with objections that are stronger, then the first principle being taken away, the resolution growes flaggy and weake. And so is it in the other also, when a man hath a desire to any thing, if it be so strong, that nothing is stronger then it, that can overtop, and overrule it, then he goes on without any impediment: but if it bee weake, so that a stronger desire can come, and overballance it, then the second principle is demolished, and there is an end of this resolution. So that let the reason on which wee fixe it bee strong, and let the inclination (which must concurre,) be fix't and strong, and then the resolution will be accordidg.