A10233:34
Two very learned sermons of M. Beza, together with a short sum of the…Two very lerned sermons of M. Beza, togither with a short sum of the…
Two very learned sermons of M. Beza, together with a short sum of the sacrament of the Lords Supper: Whereunto is added a treatise of the substance of the Lords Supper, wherein is briefly and soundly discussed the p[r]incipall points in controversy, concerning that question. By T.W.Two very lerned sermons of M. Beza, togither with a short sum of the sacrament of the Lordes Supper: Wherevnto is added a treatise of the substance of the Lords Supper, wherin is breflie and soundlie discussed the p[r]incipall points in controuersie, concerning that question. By T.W.
London: printed by Robert Walde-grave for T. Man, 1588London: printed by Robert Walde-graue for T. Man, 1588
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Wherefore in this fellow-working together of the Godhead, & the nature assumed or taken, the personal union is not deposed or overthrown, but established rather. Beside though I should ⟨p. 32⟩grant the antecedent or first proposition,1 to wit, that the word doth nothing but with and by the manhood, yet that would not follow thereupon that they imagine. For though the artificer or handicrafts man do nothing but by his instrument or tool,2 yet for all that the artificer and his tool are not united into one subsistence or being: this is my meaning, that that it doth or worketh, is not therefore united with that, by which he doth or worketh, for the doer, and the instrument of doing are two several and distinct things. So the smith or carpenter is not united with his hammer or mallet.3 The father created all things through the Son, as the holy scripture witnesseth. Now because the father created all things through the Son, shall it thereupon follow, that the father and the Son are personally united together? No verily: For they are, and that in deed distinct persons, Wherefore neither in the effusion or pouring out of powerful graces, nor in the communicating of their powerful working together, can the personal union be well described. Let that rather remain sure, that I have said, to wit, that that ⟨p. 32⟩union may rightly be called personal,4 by which it cometh to pass, that one person of two natures (the natures & properties of either nature remaining safe & sound) becometh one subsistence or being: of which two natures one, that is to say, the nature assumed or taken, hath his being in the assuming or taking nature, because if either of them did subsist or had it being of it self, they should be two persons. Moreover, before we take in hand to handle the matter it self, we must also declare, how from this personal union ensueth that which the old writers and fathers were wont to call communicating of the properties: for if both the natures themselves and the properties thereof do remain safe and sound, then there remaineth likewise unto either nature these proper attributes or things ascribed unto them: and therefore it should seem, that it cannot be attributed to one nature, which is proper and peculiar to the other.