A10250:165
Propositions and principles of divinity propounded and disputed in the university of GenevaPropositions and principles of diuinitie propounded and disputed in the vniuersitie of Geneua
Propositions and principles of divinity propounded and disputed in the university of Geneva, by certain students of divinity there, under M. Theod. Beza, and M. Anthony Faius ... Wherein is contained a methodical summary, or epitome of the common places of divinity. Translated out of Latin into English, to the end that the causes, both of the present dangers of that Church, and also of the troubles of those that are hardly dealt with else-where, may appear in the English tongue.Propositions and principles of diuinitie propounded and disputed in the vniuersitie of Geneua, by certaine students of diuinitie there, vnder M. Theod. Beza, and M. Anthonie Faius ... Wherein is contained a methodicall summarie, or epitome of the common places of diuinitie. Translated out of Latine into English, to the end that the causes, both of the present dangers of that Church, and also of the troubles of those that are hardlie dealt vvith els-vvhere, may appeare in the English tongue.
Edinburgh: printed by Robert Waldegrave, 1591Edinburgh: printed by Robert Waldegraue, 1591
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
8 For the eternal purpose of God, doth impose no other necessity upon the events, which he hath determined, then such as he will have second causes, to be moved according ⟨p. 21⟩unto their own nature: whence it followeth, that it doth not take away the contingency or voluntariness of mans will, as shall be discussed more fully, God willing, in the discourse concerning the nature of man.
8 For the aeternall purpose of God, doth impose no other necessity vpon the euents, which he hath determined, then such as hee will haue second causes, to be mooued according ⟨p. 21⟩vnto their owne nature: whence it followeth, that it doth not take away the contingencie or voluntarines of mans will, as shall be discussed more fullie, God willing, in the discourse concerning the nature of man.
9 Those two therefore, who were the first of all mankind, although in regard of that which was to come to pas, they fell not without the unchangeable appointment of God; yet in respect of the cause inherent in them, and the proper beginning of their actions, they fell contingently, not by constraint, but willingly, and altogether by a voluntary inward motion; both in respect of the understanding, who blinded, and of the will who depraved it self.
9 Those two therefore, who were the first of all mankind, althogh in regard of that which was to come to pas, they fell not without the vnchaungeable appointment of God; yet in respect of the cause inhaerent in them, and the proper beginning of their actions, they fell contingentlie, not by constraint, but willinglie, and altogeather by a voluntarie inward motion; both in respect of the vnderstanding, who blinded, and of the will who depraued it selfe.