Thirdly, it is not the being voluntary or involunt• that doth make a thing sinful or not sinful, but being opposite to the Rule, which requires complete strength to serve God withal; Now all a mans strength is not in his will, the understanding, affections, and body have their strength, which failing, though the will be never so prompt, yet the work is not done with that perfection which the Law requires: yet withal we are to note in this point two things. First, That aoriginal sin is, • do, voluntary too, because brought in by that will which was originally ours, for this is a true rule in divinity, bVoluntas ⟨p. 203⟩capitis totius naturae voluntas reputatur, that Adams will was the will of all mankind, and therefore this sin being voluntary in him, and hereditary unto us, is esteemed in some sort voluntary unto us too. Secondly, that a thing may be voluntary two ways, First, efficienter, when the will doth positively concur to the thing which is done; cSecondly, Deficienter, when the will is in fault for the thing which is done, though it were not done by it self. For we must note, that all other dfaculties were at first appointed to be subject to the will, & were not to move but upon her allowance, and conduct, and therefore when lust doth prevent the consent and command of the will, it is then manifest that the will is wanting to her office; for to her it belongs to suppress all contumacy, and to forbid the doing of any illegal thing. And in this sense I understand that frequent speech of Saint eAusten, That sin is not sin except it be voluntary, that is, sin might altogether be prevented, if the will it self had its primitive strength, and were able to exercise uprightly that office of government and moderation over the whole man which at first it was appointed unto. Which thing the same fFather divinely hath expressed in his confessions; What a monstrous thing is this, saith he, that the mind should command the body and be obeyed, and that it should command it self, and be resisted? His answer is, The will is not a total will, and therefore the command is not a total command, gfor if the will were so throughly an enemy to lust as it ought to be, it would not be quiet till it had dis-throned it.
Thirdly, it is not the being voluntary or involunt• that doth make a thing sinfull or not sinfull, but being opposite to the Rule, which requires complete strength to serve God withall; Now all a mans strength is not in his will, the understanding, affections, and bodie have their strength, which failing, though the will bee never so prompt, yet the worke is not done with that perfection which the Law requires: yet withall wee are to note in this point two things. First, That aoriginall sinne is, • do, voluntarie too, because brought in by that will which was originally ours, for this is a true rule in divinity, bVoluntas ⟨p. 203⟩capitis totius naturae voluntas reputatur, that Adams will was the will of all mankind, and therfore this sinne being voluntarie in him, and hereditarie unto us, is esteemed in some sort voluntary unto us too. Secondly, that a thing may be voluntarie two wayes, First, efficienter, when the will doth positively concurre to the thing which is done; cSecondly, Deficienter, when the will is in fault for the thing which is done, though it were not done by it selfe. For wee must note, that all other dfaculties were at first appointed to be subject to the will, & were not to move but upon her allowance, and conduct, and therefore when lust doth prevent the consent and command of the will, it is then manifest that the will is wanting to her office; for to her it belongs to suppresse all contumacie, and to forbid the doing of any illegall thing. And in this sense I understand that frequent speech of Saint eAusten, That sinne is not sin except it be voluntarie, that is, sinne might altogether be prevented, if the will it selfe had its primitive strength, and were able to exercise uprightly that office of government and moderation over the whole man which at first it was appointed unto. Which thing the same fFather divinely hath expressed in his confessions; What a monstrous thing is this, saith he, that the minde should command the body and be obeyed, and that it should command it selfe, and bee resisted? His answer is, The will is not a totall will, and therefore the command is not a totall command,
- aEx prima bomi•s mala voluntate contractu•, factum est quodammodo Haereditarium. Aug. Retract. lib. 1 cap. 13.
- bVoluntas Adae reputatur nostra Aquin p. 3. q. 84. ar•. 2. ad 3. & 12. q. 81. art. •. in corp. Andrad. Orthodox. explicat. lib. 3. Eodem modo omnium voluntates in illo conclusae censentur quo & naturae.
- cVid. Aquin. •2 qu. 79 art. 1 in C. & q. 74 art. 3. C. & Aristot. Eth lib. 3. c. 5.
- dArist. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. ult.Arist. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. vlt.
- eDe lib. Arbit. lib. 3 c. 22. Retract. l. 1. c. 13 de vera Relig. c. 14.
- fNon ex toto vult, non ergo ex toto imperat. Et iterum, non u•tque plena imperat. Et ideo sunt duae voluntates, quia una earum t•ta non est & hoc a•est […] ▪ quod al•eri dee• Confess. lib. 8. c 8 9.Non ex toto vult, non ergo ex toto imperat. Et iterum, non u•tque plena imperat. Et ideo sunt duae voluntates, quia una earum t•ta non est & hoc a•est 〈…〉 ▪ quod al•eri dee• Confess. lib. 8. c 8 9.
- gSi voluntas renatorum omni ex parte inimica esset concupiscenti•, eam è suo regno omnem exterminaret. Whicak. cont. Staplet. de Justif. lib. 3. cap. 3.