Three treatises of the vanity of the creature. The sinfulness of sin. The life…Three treatises of the vanity of the creature. The sinfulnesse of sinne. The life…

But you will say, If I may not do evil that good may come of it, then I may not do good when evil will come of it, upon the same reason, because evil is altogether to be prevented and avoided. To this I answer, that the Argument follows clean contrary, I may not do evil though good would come of it, I must do good though evil should come of it. For when a command is absolute and peremptory, we must not observe it with respect to consequences, nor foist in conditions or relations of our own to over-rule the duty, lest we make our selves Lords of the Law. Now the Commandment for doing Good, notwithstanding any consequences which may attend it, is as absolute and peremptory, as the command for not doing evil, and therefore we must not observe or forbear it with respect unto any consequences. For God will have us to measure our duty by his command, which requires to abstain from evil, and to do good, not by the Events that are incidental and external to the duty done. So then that which is good materially of it self is to be done though evil follow, first, because God requires it, and his will must stand against all consequences. Secondly, because the evil that comes along in the doing of it is not any way belonging or naturally appendant upon the duty, but is foisted into it by our wicked nature, and the wickedness of man must not either annihilate the commands of God, or void and evacuate his own duty, or lastly justify or privilege his presumptions. Thirdly, because so to do ⟨p. 249⟩is not to prevent evil, but to multiply it, not to escape sin, but to double it. We must observe Gods way of breaking of sin, and not our own; It was never known that one sin was the way to prevent or to cure another. Besides there is less sinfulness in a defect which attendeth a duty done, then in a total omission of it; for that comes in by way of consequence, the other is against the very substance and whole body of the command; that proceedeth from natural and unavoidable impotency, this from a wilfulness which might have been prevented.

But you will say, If I may not doe evill that good may come of it, then I may not doe good when evill will come of it, upon the same reason, because evill is altogether to be prevented and avoided. To this I answer, that the Argument followes cleane contrary, I may not doe evill though good would come of it, I must doe good though evill should come of it. For when a command is absolute and peremptorie, we must not observe it with respect to consequences, nor foist in conditions or relations of our owne to over-rule the duety, lest wee make our selves Lords of the Law. Now the Commandement for doing Good, notwithstanding any consequences which may attend it, is as absolute and peremptory, as the command for not doing evill, and therefore we must not observe or forbeare it with respect unto any consequences. For God will have us to measure our dutie by his command, which requires to abstaine from evill, and to doe good, not by the Events that are incidentall and externall to the dutie done. So then that which is good materially of it selfe is to be done though evill follow, first, because God requires it, and his will must stand against all consequences. Secondly, because the evill that comes along in the doing of it is not any way belonging or naturally appendant upon the dutie, but is foisted into it by our wicked nature, and the wickednesse of man must not either annihilate the commands of God, or voide and evacuate his owne dutie, or lastly justifie or priviledge his presumptions. Thirdly, because so to doe