A10663:1015
A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soul of man With the…A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soule of man With the…
A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soul of man With the several dignities and corruptions thereunto belonging. By Edward Reynolds, late preacher to the honourable society of Lincoln's Inn: and now rector of the Church of Braunston in Northamptonshire.A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soule of man With the severall dignities and corruptions thereunto belonging. By Edvvard Reynoldes, late preacher to the honorable society of Lincoln's Inne: and now rector of the Church of Braunston in Northamptonshire.
London: printed by R. Hearne and John Norton for Robert Bostock, 1640
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Then thirdly it is a most Bribelesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our w•yes. It is (if I may so speak) Gods Historion, that writes not Annals, but Journals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Hours and Moments▪ never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares ⟨p. 535⟩speak truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperor shall feel as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in to light him to his Lust. There is scarce one part in man, but may be seduced, save his Conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawn by persuasion contrary to their own propensions; this only deals faithfully with him, whose witness it is, though it be to the confusion of it self and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know err sometimes and mistake; but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its own Judgement, and register White for Black.
Then thirdly it is a most Bribelesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our w•yes. It is (if I may so speake) Gods Historion, that writes not Annals, but Iournals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Houres and Moments▪ never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares ⟨p. 535⟩speake truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperour shall feele as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poore Christians in to light him to his Lust. There is scarse one part in man, but may be seduced, save his Conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawne by perswasion contrary to their owne propensions; this onely deales faithfully with him, whose witnesse it is, though it bee to the confusion of it selfe and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know erre sometimes and mistake; but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its owne Iudgement, and register White for Blacke.
The Corruption of Conscience arises principally from two Extremes; the one occasioned by Ignorance; the other by Sin (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner) The o•e is when the want of due Knowledge draws the Conscience, to sinister determinations, either in Practise or Forbearance. The other when evil Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these contain under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.
The Corruption of Conscience arises principally from two Extremes; the one occasioned by Ignorance; the other by Sinne (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner) The o•e is when the want of due Knowledge drawes the Conscience, to sinister determinations, either in Practise or Forbearance. The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these containe under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.
From Ignorance▪ First, comes a •ettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding it self to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving Freedom to it's self in such ⟨p. 536⟩course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it self from either.
From Ignorance▪ First, comes a •ettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding it selfe to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving Freedome to it's selfe in such ⟨p. 536⟩course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it selfe from either.
Then from the other Root there comes: First, a Dead, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary Sins. A Pale, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheistical and Unnatural Sins:
Then from the other Root there comes: First, a Dead, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary Sinnes. A Pale, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheisticall and Vnnaturall Sinnes:
—Tum frigida mens est Criminibus; tacitâ s•dant prac•rdia culpa.
The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs, Cold-sweating Horror on their bosom brings.
The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs, Cold-sweating Horrour on their bosome brings.
A Desperate, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from Blasphemous and Open Sins. Not but that any of these may come from any Sin; but that the Quality of some Sins doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered Conscience. But because all these, as also this whole discourse pertains to a highe• Science, I shall here forbear to speak more of it.
A Desperate, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from Blasphemous and Open Sinnes. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne; but that the Quality of some Sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kindes of a distempered Conscience. But because all these, as also this whole discourse pertaines to a highe• Science, I shall here forbeare to speake more of it.
CHAP. XLII. Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chief Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Persuasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanical Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wills Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.
CHAP. XLII. Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perswasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wils Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.
I Proceed to the last Faculty of mens Soul, his Will. Which doth alone govern, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; Appetite, Liberty, Domination. The former respecteth an End; the two Latter, the Means thereunto conducing.1 The Desires are fixed on some Good throughly proportion to the wideness of the Heart: then the Liberty of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Judgement, makes choice of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that Good: and lastly, the Dominion employs all inferior Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.
I Proceed to the last Faculty of mens Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; Appetite, Liberty, Domination. The former respecteth an End; the two Latter, the Means thereunto conducing.1 The Desires are fixed on some Good throughly proportion to the widenesse of the Heart: then the Liberty of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Iudgement, makes choise of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that Good: and lastly, the Dominion imployes all inferiour Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.
- 1Arist. […]. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. cap. 5.Arist. 〈…〉. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. cap. 5.
Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditional occasions: but the true Ultimate, utmost and Absolute Good is God. All other Ends are Ministering and Subordinate; 1he only is [Greek or Hebrew] & [Greek or Hebrew]. as Aristotle calls his Felicity, the Supreme & overruling End; the Fountain of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that scantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they bear unto mans Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him Bonum & Bonum Superessentiale the only Self. Sustaining, and Self. Depending Good, that is only able throughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.
Sundry Ends there are, which may bee desired upon particular and conditionall occasions: but the true Vltimate, utmost and Absolute Good is God. All other Ends are Ministring and Subordinate; 1he only is 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. as Aristotle cals his Felicity, the Supreame & overruling End; the Fountaine of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that soantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they beare unto mans Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him Bonum & Bonum Superessentiale the only Self. Sustaining, and Selfe. Depending Good, that is onely able throughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.
- 1Ethic. l. 1. c. 2.
The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of Excess and Defect. The Extremes of Excess are Supers•itlon and Idolatry; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Original Blindness, with the relics of natural Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and General, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the Circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soul by occasion of the latter in a maze of of Darkness and unavoidable Doubting and Uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the Necessity of a Duty; but not to clear the Means of Execution. Light enough to enjoin a walking; but the way being a narrow ⟨p. 539⟩way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Defect, is either Atheism, in not acknowledging, or Ignorance in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if Affected and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from Guilt; or a Consciousness of fearful Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted Spirits in the persuasion that no Judge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a Desire and purpose to give Indulgence to themselves in their evil courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to entrap them, if their Eyes be but ceiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their own darkness: Though herein both the Atheists discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their own Consciences, and condemn themselves.
The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of Excesse and Defect. The Extremes of Excesse are Supers•itlon and Idolatry; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse, with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the Circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of of Darknesse and unavoydable Doubting and Vncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the Necessity of a Duty; but not to cleere the Means of Execution. Light enough to enjoyne a walking; but the way being a narrow ⟨p. 539⟩way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Desect, is either Atheisme, in not acknowledging, or Ignorance in not seeing, that God whom wee ought to serve and desire. Both which (if Affected and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from Guilt; or a Consciousnesse of fearefull Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted Spirits in the perswasion that no Iudge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a Desire and purpose to give Indulgence to themselves in their evill courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but seiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their owne darknesse: Though herein both the Atheists discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their owne Consciences, and condemne themselves.
The Dignity of mans Will in regard of Liberty, 1consisteth in the Freedom, which it hath to choose or reject Means ordained for the Compassing some proposed End, according as the Understanding shall find them more or less Conducible2 for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a choosing3 of the Means: For Election (as Aristotle determines) is never of the End. We do not Choose, but necessarily Desire to be Happy. The matter of our Happiness being proposed without appearance of present inconvenience: because every thing is naturally prone to its own Perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities ⟨p. 540⟩to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedom of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sin: So we may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty▪ Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and Unnaturalness. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite Depraved, being now in Corruption, without the Assistance of Spiritual or new Infused Grace, throughly disabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and enthralled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, only in Natural, Moral and in Civill Actions▪ Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the relics and indelible Foot prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its own and others Temporal Good.
The Dignity of mans Will in regard of Liberty, 1consisteth in the Freedome, which it hath to chuse or reject Means ordained for the Compassing some proposed End, according as the Vnderstanding shall finde them more or lesse Conducible2 for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a chusing3 of the Means: For Election (as Aristotle determines) is never of the End. Wee doe not Chuse, but necessarily Desire to be Happy. The matter of our Happinesse being proposed without appearance of present inconvenience: because every thing is naturally prone to its owne Perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities ⟨p. 540⟩to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as wee say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So wee may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty▪ Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and V•naturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite Depraved, being now in Corruption, without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly disinabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly cap•ivated and inthr•lled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, onely in Naturall, Morall and in Civill Actions▪ Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its owne and others Temporall Good.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew]. Zeno▪ apud […]. l. 6. Unde Stolel Sapientes; Reges appellahant.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Zeno▪ apud 〈…〉. l. 6. Vnde Stolel Sapientes; Reges appellahant.
- 2Ibid.
- 3Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.
The Dominion and Supreme Command of the Will is only over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its […] ▪ Authority concur as an Absolute Efficient, or a least, as a Moving Agent. It reacheth not therefore so far as to the Command of the Vegetative Power: For we cannot command our Stomachs to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the ⟨p. 541⟩vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an Universal Command of the Senses; but only by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Sovereign Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the Locomotive Power, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the Sensitive Appetite, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy▪ Irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will and the Law of the Members, carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Sovereign over those Apprehensions of the Understanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Persuasive. The one is Absolute, working on mere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditional, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an Economical Government in respect of the Body,1 and the Moving Organs thereof, as over Servants: and it hath a Politic or Civill Government ⟨p. 542⟩towards the Understanding, Affections, and Sensitive Appetite, as Subjects, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it happeneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditious and rebellious Subjects. So that the Corruption of this Power in the Will, is either Tyranny in it self, or Usurpation in another; an Abuse of it, and a Restraint of it.
The Dominion and Supreme Command of the Will is onely over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its 〈…〉 ▪ Authority concurre as an Absolut• Efficient, or a least, as a Moving Agent. It reacheth not therefore so farre as to the Command of the Vegetative Power: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the ⟨p. 541⟩vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an Vniversall Command of the Senses; but onely by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Soveraigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the Locomotive Power, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the Sensitive Appetite, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy▪ Irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will and the Law of the Members, carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Soveraigne over those Apprehensions of the Vnderstanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive. The one is Absolute, working on meere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditionall, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an Oeconomicall Government in respect of the Body,1 and the Moving Organs thereof, as over Servants: and it hath a Politique or Civill Government ⟨p. 542⟩towards the Vnderstanding, Affections, and Sensitive Appetite, as Subjects, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditiou• and rebellious Subjects. So that the Corruption of this Power in the Will, is either Tyranny in it selfe, or Vsurpation in another; an Abuse of it, and a Restraint of it.
- 1[…]. […]. l. •. c. •.〈…〉. 〈…〉. l. •. c. •.
The Abuse, when the Will absolutely gainsays the Counsels, Laws, and Directions of the Understanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Enticing & Insinuation of the Sensitive Appetite, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of those courses, which are most delightful to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soul become themselves Sensual and Carnal. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny overbears the Soul, and leads it captive to the Law of Sin, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and entangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to fly, yet falleth down again.
The Abuse, when the Will absolutely gainsayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Vnderstanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Inticing & Insinuation of the Sensitive Appetite, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of those courses, which are most delightfull to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soule become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny overbeares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though hee offer to flye, yet falleth downe againe.
Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion▪ there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Natural and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, ab Extrinseco, and that Necessarily. The Stoics, they framed a supreme ⟨p. 543⟩swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternal secret connection & flux of causes, which they call Fate. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing1 but the Uniform and Unchangeable working of those beautiful Bodies, the Heavenly Orbs, and their Influencies upon Inferiors, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Inquire the reason, why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses?
Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion▪ there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, ab Extrinseco, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme ⟨p. 543⟩swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion & flux of causes, which they call Fate. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing1 but the Vniforme and Vncha•gable working of those beautifull Bodies, the Heavenly Orbes, and their Influencies upon Inferiours, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Inquire the reason, why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breakes out into Exorbitant courses?
- 1L•ert. i• Zen. Pi•t. de placit. […]. l. •. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. G•ll. l. 6. c. 2.L•ert. i• Zen. Pi•t. de placit. 〈…〉. l. •. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. G•ll. l. 6. c. 2.
Anne aliud, quàm——[…], & occulti miranda potentia Fati?
Anne aliud, quàm——〈…〉, & occulti miranda potentia Fati?