First, the rule of Aristotle, whose maxim it is, that Hatred is always [Greek or Hebrew] against the whole kind of its object▪ so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not General, but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences. For since tho nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, Sin. In which, though there is no man, which finds not himself more obnoxious and open to one kind than another (it being the long experienced policy of the Devil to observe the diverse conditions of mens natures, constitutions, callings, and employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will;) insomuch that a man may here in happily deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices persuade to a casual dislike thereof, yet I say it is certain, that if a mans Hatred of Sin be ⟨p. 143⟩not [Greek or Hebrew] an Universal and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his persuasions to himself what they will, this is rather a personated than a true hatred a meteor of the brain, than an affection of the Soul. For as in the good, so in the ill of things; notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes (as Seneca saith) Scelera dissident, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God (as in Herod and Pilate against Christ) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united passion. And hence is that of Saint James, He that offendeth in one is guilty of all; because in that one he contemneth that Original Authority which forbade all. There are no terms of consistence between love and hatred divided upon the same uniform Object.
First, the rule of Aristotle, whose maxime it is, that Hatred is alwaies 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 against the whole kinde of its object▪ so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not Generall, but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences. For since tho nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs bee irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniforme nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principall object of a right hatred, Sin. In which, though there is no man, which finds not himselfe more obnoxious and open to one kind than another (it being the long experienced policie of the Devill to observe the diverse conditions of mens natures, constitutions, callings, and imployments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will;) insomuch that a man may here in happily deceive himselfe with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices perswade to a casuall dislike thereof, yet I say it is certaine, that if a mans Hatred of Sinne be ⟨p. 143⟩not 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 an Vniversall and transcendent Hatred against all sinne, even those which his personall relations make more proper unto him, if hee doth still retaine some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his perswasions to himselfe what they will, this is rather a personated than a true hatred a meteor of the braine, than an affection of the Soule. For as in the good, so in the ill of things; notwithstanding there seeme to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes (as Seneca saith) Scelera dissident, that sinnes do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God (as in Herod and Pilate against Christ) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united passion. And hence is that of Saint Iames, Hee that offendeth in one is guilty of all; because in that one hee contemneth that Originall Authority which forbad all. There are no tearmes of consistence betweene love and hatred divided upon the same uniforme Object.
