Other Objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concern the Body; and they are both the Moral and Contemplative Actions of the Mind; To both which Aristotle hath attributed1 principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts less laborious, as residing in that part of the Soul, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest simplest and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent; spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choicest perfections, whereby the Soul may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both Grief and Anxiety; but this is never natural to the act of Knowledge, which is always in its own virtue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazzleth the power; or out of the weakness and doubtings of the Understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof; or out of the admixtion and sleeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men minister ⟨p. 201⟩unto themselves desperate thoughts or weak fears, or guilty griefs, or unlimited Desires, according as is the property of the Object joined with their own private distempers: Thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is natural unto it, to produce, but Doubtings,2 Terrors and Disquietings of Conscience; it being the property of the works of Darkness to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all these former objects of mans Delight (because they are amongst Solomons Catalogue of things under the3 Sun) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let pass the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madness and not Joy. For4 Seneca telleth us that true Joy is a serious and severe thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular Delights, which have wings to fly from us and thorns to prick us, even that highest natural Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sun, and therefore not obnoxious to Solomons vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yielding rather a windy Pleasure than a true Delight.
Other Objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concerne the Body; and they are both the Morall and Contemplative Actions of the Mind; To both which Aristotle hath attributed1 principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts lesse laborious, as residing in that part of the Soule, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest simplest and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, cleare, independant; spirituall, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choisest perfections, whereby the Soule may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both Griefe and Anxiety; but this is never naturall to the act of Knowledg, which is alwaies in its owne vertue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weaknesse and doubtings of the Vnderstanding, which hath not a cleare light thereof; or out of the admixtion and sleeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men minister ⟨p. 201⟩unto themselves desperate thoughts or weake feares, or guilty griefes, or unlimited Desires, according as is the property of the Object joyned with their own private distempers: Thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is naturall unto it, to produce, but Doubtings,2 Terrours and Disquietings of Conscience; it being the propertie of the workes of Darknesse to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all these former objects of mans Delight (because they are amongst Salomons Catalogue of things under the3 Sunne) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let passe the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madnesse and not Ioy. For4 Seneca telleth us that true Ioy is a serious and severe thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular Delights, which have wings to fly from us and thornes to prick us, even that highest naturall Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sunne, and therfore not obnoxious to Salomons vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yeelding rather a windy Pleasure than a true Delight.
- 1Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.
- 2Joh. 3. 20. Job 21. 14. Isa. 30. 11. 2 Pet. 3. 5.Ioh. 3. 20. Iob 21. 14. Isa. 30. 11. 2 Pet. 3. 5.
- 3Eccles. 2. 2. [Greek or Hebrew]Eccles. 2. 2. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉
- 4Soph•c Alex. Senec. Epist. • 3
