A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soul of man With the…A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soule of man With the…

Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is ab extrinsec•, and dispersed over things, (though they are not otherwise the Objects of Thought, than as the Mind reflecteth on the Phan•asmata or images of them in this faculty) but the latter, which is the quickness of Apprehension, though it may seem to be the most peculiar work of Reason, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper work of the Understanding, yet the form and quality of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in¹ that strict sense, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightness, volubility, and suddenness thereof, ⟨p. 24⟩proceeds from the immediate restlessness of the Imagination; as is plain, by the continual variety of Dreams and other Fancies, wherein the Faculty is the principal worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a property of boldness beyond other faculties: For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they always frame themselves to the truth of things, yielding assent to nothing but what they find: But the Imagination is a Faculty boundless, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which it self maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of persuasion and insinuation, Poetry, Mythology, and Eloquence (the Arts of rational Fancy) have ever (as was observed) been more forcible than those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason; it being (as Scaliger observes) the natural infiniteness of mans Soul. Aspernari c•rtorum sinium praescriptionem, to disdain any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, of these two grounds of multiplicitie in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is ab extrinsec•, and dispersed over things, (though they are not otherwise the Objects of Thought, than as the Mind reflecteth on the Phan•asmata or images of them in this facultie) but the latter, which is the quicknesse of Apprehension, though it may seeme to be the most peculiar worke of Reason, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper worke of the Vnderstanding, yet the forme and qualitie of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in