Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the several references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good; and secondarily, the Evil of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficulty and danger accompanying them. And both these again are to be determined with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Faculty, in virtue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may be considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including only the natural convenience or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Faculty: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evil, Hatred▪ which are the two radical, fundamental, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi, the weight and force, and (as I may so speak) the first springings and out goings of the Soul. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of real union (though never without that which ⟨p. 40⟩the Schools call unio objectiva, union of Apprehension in the Understanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if Evil, •light, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a real contract or union with the Faculty; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evil, Grief and Sorrow. Again, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficulty and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the natural strength of the power; which implieth, in respect of Good, an Impossibility to be attained, and so it worketh Despair; and in respect of Evil, an Improbability of being avoided, and so it worketh Fear: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aides which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope; and Evil is presented, either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldness to break through it;
Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good; and secondarily, the Evill of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Facultie, in vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so doe they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may be considered simply in its owne nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred▪ which are the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out goings of the Soule. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union (though never without that which ⟨p. 40⟩the Schooles call vnio objectiva, union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if Evill, •light, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aides which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope; and Evill is presented, either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it;
