And this indeed, although it be in it self a defect of Learning; yet considering the Estate of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Understanding by continual Inquiry (man being •ound in this also to recover that measure of his first fullness, which is attainable in this Corrupted Estate, by sweat of brain, by labour and degrees, Paulatim extundere arts) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Judgement (so it be not Universal in all conclusions; for that argues more1 weakness, than choice of conceit; nor Particular in things of Faith and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Useful. Commendable, because it prevent• all temper of heresy (whose nature is to †be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softness of Judgement, which will not suffer it self to be captivated, either to its own conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to descry weakness. And this is▪ that which Pliny commends in his friend Titus Ariston, whose hesitancy and slowness of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptiness or unfurniture; but ex diversitate Rationū qua• acrimagnoque Judicio ab origine Caus• que primis repetit, discernit, expendit: out of a learned cautelousn•sse of judgment, which made him so long su spend his Assent, till he had weighed the several repugnancies of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same Pliny elsewhere out of Thucydides observes) It is rawness & deficiency of learning that ⟨p. 482⟩makes bold and peremptory: [Greek or Hebrew] Demurs3 and fearfulness of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings▪ First, they lessen, the number of heresies, which are (as I said) always obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But Heresy coming under the shape of Science, with shows of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Understanding, and possess it with false Assents, than yield occasion of deeper search, unless it meet with a more piercing Judgement, which can through confidence descry weakness.
And this indeed, although it be in it selfe a defect of Learning; yet considering the Estate of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Vnderstanding by continuall Inquiry (man being •ound in this also to recover that measure of his •irst fulnesse, which is attainable in this Corrup•ed Estate, by sweat of braine, by labour and degrees, Paulatim extundere artes) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Iudgement (so it be not Vniversall in all conclusions; for that argues more1 weaknesse, than choise of conceit; nor Particular in things of Faith and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Vsefull. Commendable, because it prevent• all temper of heresie (whose nature is to †be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softnes of Iudgement, which will not suffer it selfe to be captivated, either to its owne conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to descry weaknesse. And this is▪ that which Pliny commends in his friend Titus Ariston, whose hesitancy and slownesse of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptines or unfurniture; but ex diversitate Rationū qua• acrimagnoque Iudicio ab origine Caus• que primis repetit, discernit, expendit: out of a learned cautelousn•sse of judgment, which made him so long su spend his Assent, till he had weighed the severall repugnancies of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same Pliny elsewhere out of Thucydides observes) It is rawnes & deficiency of learning that ⟨p. 482⟩makes bold and peremptory: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Demurs3 and fearfulnes of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings▪ First, they lessen, the number of heresies, which are (as I said) alwaies obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But Heresie comming under the shape of Science, with shewes of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Vnderstanding, and possesse it with false Assents, than yeeld occasion of deeper search, unlesse it meet with a more piercing Iudgement, which can through confidence descry weaknesse.
- 1Vid. qu• adve. su• […] disputat Aristocles apud E•seb. de p•aepar. Evang. l 14. c 18.Vid. qu• adve. su• 〈…〉 disputat Aristocles apud E•seb. de p•aepar. Evang. l 14. c 18.
- †Ad quam cu• que sunt di• […], qu•st •empestate de lapsi ad […]. •nquam ad Saxum ad haerescunt. Ci•. Acad▪ q. l. 4. Ply. •. •. •p. 22.Ad quam cu• que sunt di• 〈…〉, qu•st •empestate de lapsi ad 〈…〉. •nquam ad Saxum ad haerescunt. Ci•. Acad▪ q. l. 4. Pli•. •. •. •p. 22.
- 3Lib. 4. ep. 7.
