A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soul of man With the…A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soule of man With the…

The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion between the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazzles the Power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than inform; and things too Material and Immersed, are like a Mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath Truth in it, be the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soul with the Body, in this present Estate, restrains and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not only the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those Vespertiliones, to which Aristotle hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence ⟨p. 465⟩with the Body) there is required a mixture of Contraries in the Air; it must not be too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must be a kind of middle Temper; clearness of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degrees of Darkness for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of mans Understanding must participate of the two contr•ries, Abstraction and Materiality. Abstraction first, in proportion to the […] of the Understanding, which is Spiritual. And Materiality too, in respect of the Sense, on which the Understanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporal. So that where ever there is Difficulty and Uncertainty of Operation in the Understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first in the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plain by a familiar similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction seem greater. Where first we may descry an Imperfection in the Organ;

The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion betweene the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazles the Power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than informe; and things too Material and Immerst, are like a Mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath Truth in it, be the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Body, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those Vespertiliones, to which Aristotle hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence