3 Another Cause may be the other Extreme1 (for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. Et credere, quàm scire, videtur […], we rather believe, than know what we assent unto. Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of Learned men to read them always with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withal, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resign our judgements into another mans. hand. Belief, without evidence of Reason, must be only there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestion• ble, and where it is impossible to […], there only ⟨p. 491⟩it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions, Quibus possibile est subesse falsum, what he said of Friendship, Sic ama tanquam Os•s, Love with that Wisdom as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantageous in Knowledge: Sic▪ creed tanquam dissensurus, so to believe, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much2 straitening of a mans own Understanding, to enthral it unto any: or to esteem the dissent from some particular Authorities, Presumption and Self-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, than Factions and Sidings. When as Seneca said of Cato, that he would rather esteem Drunkenness a Virtue, than Cato Vicious: So Peripatetics and Platonists, Scotists, & Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortal men) shall rather count Error, Truth, than their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reins of his own fancy: or to a presumptuous dependence only on his own judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Judgment, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, Aristotle's speech is true, Oportet discentem credere, Beginners3 must believe.
3 Another Cause may be the other Extreme1 (for a man may lose his way, as well by enclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when wee bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. Et credere, quàm scire, videtur 〈…〉, we rather beleeve, than know what we assent unto. Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of Learned men to read them alwaies with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. Wee may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans. hand. Beleefe, without evidence of Reason, must bee onely there absolute, where the Authority is Vnquestion• ble, and where it is impossible to 〈…〉, there onely ⟨p. 491⟩it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions, Quibus possibile est subesse falsum, what he said of Friendship, Sic ama tanquam Os•s, Love with that Wisedome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge: Sic▪ crede tanquam dissensurus, so to beleeve, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much2 streightning of a mans owne Vnderstanding, to inthrall it unto any: or to esteeme the dissent from some particular Authorities, Presumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, than Factions and Sidings. When as Seneca said of Cato, that hee would rather esteeme Drunkennesse a Vertue, than Cato Vitious: So Peripateticks and Platonists, Scotists, & Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) shall rather count Errour, Truth, than their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a presumptuous dependance onely on his owne judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progresse. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Iudgment, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, Aristotl's speech is true, Oportet discentem credere, Beginners3
- 1Non tam A• thoritas in disputando, quā rationis momenta quarē da s•t, &c. Ci•. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.Non tam A• thoritas in disputando, quā rationis momenta quarē da s•t, &c. Ci•. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.
- 2Vid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Un•tat. Eccli•. cap. 19. C•tra Crescon. Gramat. l. 2. c. 32. & […]. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cacilium.Vid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Vn•tat. Eccli•. cap. 19. C•tra Crescon. Gramat. l. 2. c. 32. & 〈…〉. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cacilium.
- 3Vid. Theodor. serm. 1. d• •ide & Plat•n. apud •seb. l. 12. c. 1.
