But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good▪ yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all Natural Agents aim still at their own Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evil pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appear therefore how the Understanding doth always propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Understanding it self known to be evil. And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its own Knowledge, as Evil. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and Evil: For first, all Evil of Sin, (though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is Destructive; yet) on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and corrupt. As continual drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropic Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, only that he may ⟨p. 521⟩thereby come to Destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise Goodness, though it have the most absolute Convenience to man, as it is Perfective, & in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet […] hath as great a disconvenience toward mens corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to square them by, & in respect of its Rectitude. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes, it works more trouble than delight,1 because as in Philosophy▪ Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis so, Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetenti•.
But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good▪ yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their owne Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evill pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Vnderstanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their owne Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Vnderstanding it selfe knowne to be evill. And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its owne Knowledge, as Evill. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and Evill: For first, all Evill of Sin, (though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is Destructive; yet) on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and corrupt. As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drinke for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, onely that hee may ⟨p. 521⟩therby come to Destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but onely to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise Goodnes, though it have the most absolute Convenience to man, as it is Perseclive, & in respect of his finall advancement thereby; yet 〈…〉 hath as great a disconvenience toward mens corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to s•uare them by, & in respect of its R•ctitude. As light, thou•h it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes, it works more trouble than delight,1 because as in Philosophy▪ Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis so, Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetenti•.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew]. Addst ethic. l. 3. •. 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. A•st •thic. l. 3. •. 7.
