A14095:100
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And if our 1life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our being also a true being? especially, if as you say, all things that are, do participate of Gods being. But let us come to Seneca's interpretation hereof; that is they put on a countenance of being for a time, being incapable of the stability, and solidity of true being. Mark, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. For either the being of sensible things is a true being or no. You say a true being, then herein you shall contradict both, Plato and your self also: If not a true being, then seeing it is said that in this they continue not, it followeth that they want not so much continuance of true being, as continuance of such a being, as is no true being. Nay the Gloss corrupts the text, as I prove thus. They that want continuance or stability of true being, fail not in the want of true being, but only in want of continuance of true being: so that her by it must be confessed, they have true being, though they have little or no continuance therein. Again it doth not follow, that because they want continuance, therefore they are uncapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earth for ever if it please him? Yet these are sensible things. Again what meant either the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible things have no stability of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earth were to continue for ever, as well as immaterial substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Charter of their Maker. And of this we read from you, of the other we read not. I willingly confess, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by ⟨p. 64⟩the Father unto the Son; and therefore I have already misliked, that you should maintain, that the Creatures do participate of Gods being.
And if our 1life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our beinge allso a true beinge? especially, if as you say, all thinges that are, doe participate of Gods beinge. But let us come to Senecaes interpretation herof; that is they put on a countenance of beinge for a time, being incapable of the stability, and soliditie of true beinge. Marke, I pray, whether this be a sober speeche. For eyther the beinge of sensible things is a true beinge or no. You say a true beinge, then herin you shall contradict both, Plato and your selfe allso: If not a true beinge, then seinge it is sayde that in this they continue not, it followethe that they want not so much continuance of true beinge, as continuance of such a being, as is no true beinge. Nay the Glosse corrupts the text, as I proove thus. They that want continuance or stabilitie of true beinge, fayle not in the want of true beinge, but only in want of continuance of true beinge: so that her by it must be confessed, they have true beinge, thoughe they have litle or no continuance therin. Agayne it dothe not followe, that because they want continuance, therfore they are uncapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earthe for ever if it please him? Yet these are sensible thinges. Agayne what meant eyther the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible thinges have no stabilitie of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earthe were to continue for ever, as well as immateriall substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Chartar of their Maker. And of this we reade from you, of the other we reade not. I willingly confesse, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by