A14095:1005
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And so much some conceived to be signified, when he saith: The Prince of the World cometh and finds nought in me: 1Yet cannot the Devil certainly prevail to every particular, nor to any particular, so as to justify, that man doth not that evil which he doth sponte; for even beasts do sponte whatsoever they do, and man even the worst of men doth not only of his own accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also, yea and freely too; And yet the Devil is none of those external things you speak of, with far more colour of reason did they proceed, who maintained, that look what men did of passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraint of doing voluntarily, not from things external, but internal rather even from the passion themselves, but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long ago.2
And so much some conceaved to be signified, when he sayth: The Prince of the World commeth and sindes nought in me: 1Yet cannot the Divell certainly prevaile to every particular, nor to any particular, so as to justifie, that man doth not that evill which he doth sponte; for even beasts doe sponte whatsoever they doe, and man even the worst of men doth not onely of his owne accord, that which he doth but voluntarily also, yea and freely too; And yet the Divell is none of those externall things you speake of, with farre more colour of reason did they proceed, who mainteyned, that looke what mē did of passion, they did not voluntarily, fetching the restraynt of doeing voluntarily, not from things externall, but internall rather even from the passion themselves, but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long agoe.2
- 1Joh. 14. 30Ioh. 14. 30
- 2Eth. 3.